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Chapter 1 develops a model advancing a new rationale for high CEO pay - the
board’s incentive to signal confidence in the CEO’s capabilities. The CEO creates
value for the firm by stimulating investments from various stakeholders, such as the
firm’s workers, analysts, or financiers. However, the payoffs to these investments
often depend on the CEO’s ability, which is difficult for stakeholders to directly
observe. The model considers one specific stakeholder interested in the board’s as-
sessment of the CEO’s capabilities, an analyst who may produce information that
will have little value if the CEO is subsequently terminated. Because the firm’s
board both has private information about the CEO’s ability and sets his wage, high
compensation can positively influence the analyst’s belief about the CEO’s ability,
v
thereby increasing her incentives to collect information and improve the firm’s deci-
sion making. The model thus predicts that signaling the CEO’s capabilities is self-
fulfilling: because stakeholders infer that a well-paid CEO has higher ability, they
increase their investments, justifying the cost of the CEO’s compensation. Chapter
2 presents broad empirical support for the main idea and assumptions used in the
theory model presented in Chapter 1. It addresses trends in corporate governance,
decreasing job security for CEOs, the role of analysts as stakeholders, and various
signaling mechanisms boards may use to enhance the CEO’s credibility. Chapter
3 explores how varying degrees of trader anonymity in financial markets impacts
trading behavior and market characteristics. A surprising result emerges. Informed
traders are not always better off with their identities protected, i.e., they may prefer
to transact in relatively transparent markets. The reason is that in more trans-
parent markets, the visibility of the informed trader’s behavior creates an incentive
for him to “bluff” the market maker, sometimes trading against his information.
But because the market maker understands this incentive, prices are less sensitive
to order flow. Thus, more transparent markets may in fact exhibit higher levels of
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Improve a Firm’s Access to
Information?
1.1 Introduction
An important function of financial markets is to provide firms with timely, accu-
rate information that allows them to make better decisions. For example, firms
can use stock prices to better monitor and compensate managers (Holmstrom and
Tirole, (1999)) or to improve their investment efficiency (Dow and Gorton (1997),
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999)).1 Empirical evidence confirms that such feed-
back from prices to firm behavior is not merely theoretical. Luo (2005) finds, for
example, that stock price reactions to merger announcements impact the decision
of whether to complete the merger. Giammarino et al. (2004) argue that managers
learn about their firm’s prospects from observing price reactions to seasoned equity
offerings, withdrawing the offering when the reception is poor. Several papers ex-
amine price sensitivities of investment, including Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004)
and Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (forthcoming). Each of these studies suggests that
the incorporation of private information into prices can benefit firms.
However, collecting information about the firm can be risky, especially if it is
1Other relevant papers include Dow and Rahi (2003), Goldstein and Guembel (2005), and Dow,
Goldstein, and Guembel (2007).
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long-lived. When a firm alters strategy or replaces key top management, for example,
previously collected information may be rendered stale, especially when it relates to
an assessment of a specific manager’s capabilities, or when a chosen strategy is likely
to differ from that chosen by a potential successor. Empirical evidence including
Weisbach (1995), Denis and Denis (1995), Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosemburg (2001),
and Bertrand and Schoar (2003) confirms that CEOs play meaningful roles in their
firm’s strategies implying that turnover, especially forced replacement, will generally
be associated with significant strategic changes – changes that would likely impact
the value of long-lived information previously collected about the firm.
This reasoning suggests that stable management can be as asset, increasing
the ex ante incentives of analysts, hedge funds, or portfolio managers to produce
long-lived information pertaining to a management team’s capabilities. Because the
board is ultimately responsible for replacing the CEO, it also implies that the board
has an incentive to appear confident in the CEO’s long-term capabilities. This paper
develops a signaling model in which the board does exactly this, using the CEO’s
compensation strategically to promote him as a viable and stable leader.
In the model, the firm has a long-lived risky project whose productivity
depends on top management (think about the firm starting a new line of business
that exploits the CEO’s specialized skills). After the project begins, an investor may
collect a costly private signal about the project’s probability of success. By later
trading on this signal, the investor is compensated for her information gathering
costs, but also permits the firm to benefit from her efforts. To the extent that
the firm can infer the investor’s signal from prices, it can adjust its investment
accordingly, scaling up (down) in the event that positive (negative) information is
inferred.
However, although the firm’s project is long-lived, the CEO’s tenure may not
be. In particular, the board holds the option to replace the incumbent if it encounters
a more talented replacement. Importantly, the likelihood of this depends on the
incumbent CEO’s ability, which is privately known by the board.2 This information
2The assumption that the board holds a private signal about the CEO’s ability is reasonable,
but need not be interpreted strictly. For example, the CEO may be hired largely because of his
networks and personal relationships, human-capital assets that create value for the firm. Although
these assets need not stem directly from the CEO’s ability, they play a similar role in the analysis
in that the board is not only likely to have an information advantage over the market in assessing
their value to the firm, but is also likely to consider this assessment when making any termination
decision.
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is of particular interest to the investor, who is reluctant to collect a manager-specific
signal about a management team who may soon be replaced.
The motivation for signaling arises from the fact that although the investor
cannot directly observe the CEO’s ability, she does observe his compensation, which
provides information about the board’s assessment of him. Because more talented
CEOs are more productive, they can bargain with the board for a higher wage.
However, more talented CEOs are also less likely to be terminated (a choice endo-
genized in the model), simply because the board is less likely to encounter a more
talented potential replacement. The investor is therefore more likely to produce
long-term information about a highly compensated CEO because she infers him to
be of higher ability, and thus more likely to be retained for an extended period of
time.
The link between compensation, longevity, and information production means
that boards may have incentives to rationally overpay their CEOs, balancing the
cost of overpayment against the benefit of stimulating the investor to produce long-
term information. This paper thus presents a novel explanation for high CEO pay,
one motivated by the observation that although the board’s assessment of the CEO
is likely to be important for investors, credibly communicating this information may
be difficult. When investors infer the CEO’s ability from his wage, even firms with
comparatively less talented CEOs will pay “superstar” wages, hoping to stimulate
the production of long-lived information normally reserved for exceptional managers
with long expected horizons.
Importantly, overpaying the CEO is a value-maximizing choice, in contrast
to the ‘managerial power’ hypothesis in which weak boards are unable to prevent
CEOs from extracting rents from shareholders (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000),
Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004)). Indeed, the presence of a strong board here is
crucial – it is the board’s ability and willingness to terminate the CEO that provides
the original motivation to signal its confidence in his ability. Thus, although the
model certainly does not imply that weak governance cannot generate exorbitant
compensation, it does show that strong governance may not represent a quick fix.
Although a tough board may prevent the CEO from setting his own pay, the threat
of board activism may introduce a new set of problems, e.g., reducing the incentives
of investors to produce long-lived information. This implies that the benefits of strict
governance may have limits, generating an incentive for strong boards to downplay
3
this potential for activism by showing support for the CEO.
Rather than entrench the manager (Almazan and Suarez (2003) or reduce
the perception of the board’s power (Adams and Ferreira, 2007), this paper shows
that signaling the CEO’s ability can have a similar effect on the market’s invest-
ment in long-term information. Entrenching the manager with a long-term contract
or generous severance may increase the CEO’s tenure (leaving aside whether such
commitments are credible), but are also likely to worsen any existing CEO agency
problems. Besides being subject to neither concern, the CEO’s compensation is
highly publicized, ensuring that a wide range of long-term investors have access to a
succinct measure that reflects the board’s assessment of the CEO’s ability. Finally,
it is also worth mentioning that although the board in the model fully anticipates
the effect of overpaying the CEO, such foresight is not required for the signal to be
effective. A board that mistakenly views its CEO as highly capable and pays him as
such, for example, will still stimulate the production of long-term information from
investors. In other words, if a board (even wrongly) believes that its CEO is worth
his wage, then this belief may become self-fulfulling. For this reason, a board’s
overconfidence in its ability to evaluate and select talent may further contribute to
the effectiveness of the signal.
Although the model deals specifically with information production, a similar
interpretation would likely extend to other parties with a stake in the firm’s long-
term strategy. For example, the firm’s workers are often asked to make human
capital investments that depend on the strategy endorsed by a CEO. Like long-
term investors, workers may be concerned that management turnover may reduce
the value of their investments, making the board’s assessment of top management
an important consideration for workers. Even if the board doesn’t replace him
immediately, a CEO lacking the board’s confidence may encounter resistance from
the board, damaging his credibility with the firm’s workers and other stakeholders
whose input is crucial for the firm’s success.
The model explores three factors that affect the board’s incentive to signal.
The first is the investor’s cost of producing information. When information be-
comes more difficult to collect, the investor becomes more selective about the firms
she covers, producing information only about firms with low probabilities of board
interference. Thus, an increase in the cost of collecting information increases the
minimum CEO compensation required to induce the investor to produce informa-
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tion, implying that when information collection is costly, few firms find it worthwhile
to overpay their CEOs. A second factor I explore is the CEO’s bargaining power in
wage negotiations with the board. When the CEO has high bargaining power (per-
haps because he manages a firm in an industry requires rare and specialized skills),
he can negotiate a larger fraction of the surplus he creates. But because a CEO’s
wage will never exceed the entire surplus, there is less scope for strategic overpay-
ment when a CEO’s bargaining power (and share of the surplus) is high. The final
effect pertains to the degree to which the investor’s information is CEO-specific. I
find that when the investor’s cost of gathering information is low, information that
is less CEO-specific increases the fraction of boards that strategically overpay.
Finally, the model suggests that strategic overpayment is likely to be impor-
tant when CEOs play large roles in determining their firms strategies. For example,
CEOs likely have comparatively large impacts on the strategies of young firms or
those in industries depending heavily on human capital investments such as tech-
nology, software, or service. In addition, the extent to which the firm depends on
stock prices to guide its investment also affects its incentive to encourage the pro-
duction of information from investors. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) show that
price-investment sensitivities of financially constrained firms are higher, and Chen,
Goldstein, and Jiang (forthcoming) show that firms whose stocks contain more pri-
vate information incorporate this information into their investment decisions. The
results of these studies suggest a connection between compensation, information
production, and investment-price sensitivities that is readily testable.
The model depends explicitly on feedback from the information contained in
stock prices to real investment decisions by the firm, a mechanism featured in Leland
(1992), Holmstrom and Tirole (1999), Dow and Gorton (1997), Subrahmanyam and
Titman (1999), Dow and Rahi (2003), and Dow, Goldstein, and Guembel (2007).
One contribution of my paper is the specific channel through which the firm en-
courages the investor to collect information, trade on it, and thereby increase the
informativeness of prices. It also contributes to an extensive literature on the deter-
minants of CEO compensation, including theories based on tournaments (e.g., Rosen
(1981)), agency (e.g., Holmstrom (1979)), and direct productivity (e.g., Gabaix and
Landier (2008)). 3 Although my model does not consider an agency problems by
the CEO, Holmstrom and Tirole (1999) suggests that the model’s intuition would
3See Murphy (1999) for an extensive review.
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still apply. To the extent that the investor’s information allows the firm to better in-
fer managerial misbehavior, the firm can provide more efficient incentives, implying
that the board may desire to attract the attention of long-term investors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 defines the model’s economic
environment, including the players, the decisions they face, and their respective pay-
offs. Section 1.3 explores the CEO’s compensation under a variety of informational
assumptions. First, in subsection 1.3.1, I establish a benchmark – the CEO’s wage
with no analysts. I then explore in section 1.3.2 the CEO’s compensation after in-
troducing an analyst who, by producing information, allows the firm to improve its
investment decisions. Even when the CEO’s ability is common knowledge (to the
board and analyst), a ‘superstar’ effect arises where the compensation of a top CEO
is markedly higher than a less talented counterpart. Finally, in subsection 1.3.3,
I allow the board to know more about the CEO’s ability than the analyst. I de-
velop the model’s main result in this subsection, where the board uses compensation
strategically to signal the CEO’s ability I conclude in section 1.4.
1.2 The Model
Consider a four-date model t = 0, 1, 2, 3, involving the following players: an all-
equity firm, its board, its CEO, and an investor in its stock. The firm’s cash flows
are:
π(S,α) = α+ (1 + ∆̃)S − c(S), (1.1)
where α is the talent of the firm’s CEO, S is the firm’s capital stock, and ∆̃ is a
CEO-specific shock to the productivity of the firm’s assets.4 The firm cannot directly
observe ∆̃, which can take either high (+1) or low (-1) values with equal probability.
Additionally, the firm faces a cost of implementing its technology, c(S) = S
2
2 . The
game proceeds as follows:
• At t = 0, the board privately learns the ability of its incumbent CEO, α0 ∈
[0, 1] and offers him a publicly observable wage, C(α0).
4The model’s results are not sensitive to this particular specification, which is chosen for
tractability. For example, allowing the CEO’s talent to impact the productivity of the firm’s
assets, e.g., π(S, α) = α (1 + ∆̃)S − c(S) does not change either the results or intuition.
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• At t = 1, the investor may collect a signal about ∆̃. Collecting this information
costs k > 0.
• At t = 2, the board interviews and learns the ability of a potential replacement
CEO, α2 ∈ [0, 1]. At this time, the firm may replace the incumbent CEO. The
investor’s signal about ∆̃ is less informative if the CEO is replaced.
• At t = 3, the firm’s stock is traded and the firm invests. If the investor
has collected a signal, she will trade on it and (in expectation) increase the
informativeness of the firm’s stock price. The firm invests after observing its
stock price and realizes a final payoff.















1.2.1 Trading and Investment, t=3
The ultimate goal of the board is to maximize firm value, which in this case occurs
by increasing the information content of the firm’s stock price, thereby allowing the
firm to invest more efficiently. However, the price informativeness of the firm’s t = 3
stock price depends on prior events: 1) whether the analyst has acquired a private
signal about ∆̃ at t = 1, and 2) whether the firm has experienced a CEO turnover
at t = 2 which would reduce the quality of the analyst’s signal. Without loss of
generality, suppose that the analyst has collected a signal that with probability β
is perfectly correlated with ∆̃, and with probability 1 − β is uninformative. β = 0
thus corresponds to either a completely uninformative signal or an analyst that has
chosen not to produce information.
If the analyst does not to investigate, the firm’s stock price cannot reflect
any information about ∆̃, so that the firm will optimize expression (1.1) taking
E[∆̃] = 0, giving S∗ = 1 and expected cash flows equal to α + 12 . However, if
the analyst’s collects an informative signal (β > 0), and if the firm can infer this
information, it will adjust S upward (downward) by β if the analyst receives a
positive (negative) signal about ∆̃. Because the firm expects the analyst to receive
positive and negative signals with equal probability, its expected cash flow with






2 = α +
1+β2
2 . Comparing this expected cash










for the analyst’s signal about ∆̃, allowing it to scale its investment accordingly.
The firm can infer the analyst’s signal by observing its stock price which,
because the analyst will trade on her information, more accurately reflects the firm’s
fundamentals. The trading game is a highly stylized Kyle (1985) setting. There are
three parties: 1) a single informed analyst who submits a unit buy or sell order,
x ∈ {−1,+1}, 2) a cohort of noise traders with aggregate demand u, which is i.i.d.
discrete uniform [−1,+1], i.e., u = −1, 0, or +1 with equal probability, and 3)
a risk-neutral, competitive market maker. The market maker, observing only the
aggregate order flow, z = u + x, sets the price equal to the expected value of the
firm’s terminal cash flows.
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The set of possible order flows is z ∈ {−2,−1, 0,+1,+2}, of which z ∈
{+1,+2} reveal that the analyst has received a positive signal. To see this, note
that because the analyst’s cost of gathering information is sunk, she always trades
after receiving her signal, so that aggregate order flows always reflect either a unit
buy or sell from the analyst. Because z = +1 and z = +2 are only possible if the
analyst’s demand is x = +1, the market maker can infer that the analyst’s signal
about the firm’s profitability shock is positive. By similar reasoning, z = −1 or
z = −2 indicate that the analyst’s signal is negative. Only z = 0 is uninformative.







2 if z ≤ −1
α+ (1+β)
2
2 if z ≥ +1
α+ 12 if z = 0.
(1.3)
Each of these prices reflects the market maker’s rational expectations with
respect to the quality of the analyst’s information, her trading strategy, and to the
firm’s investment policy. That is, if the market maker knows that the firm will use
the information contained in prices to invest more efficiently, prices will reflect that
eventuality. For example, if z = −1, the market maker anticipates that the firm will
infer that the analyst’s signal is negative, will choose S = 1 − β, and (substituting




Prior to investing at t = 3 but after the analyst’s decision at t = 1 to collect
CEO-specific information about ∆̃, the board has the opportunity to replace the
incumbent CEO. This timing assumption is intended to capture the idea that when
a CEO is terminated, the board must consider the impact of past investments by the
firm’s stakeholders, and the likely impact CEO turnover has on the payoffs to these
investments. The board compares the firm’s value with the incumbent CEO (along
with the payoffs of any CEO-specific investments) to that with the replacement,
and selects the CEO that maximizes firm value. The board faces no agency costs of
replacing the CEO.
At t = 0, the board privately learns the ability of its CEO, α0, which is
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drawn from U [0, 1]. At t = 2, the firm interviews a potential replacement CEO and
learns his ability α2, also drawn (independently of α0) from U [0, 1]. If the ability
of the potential replacement is sufficiently high, the firm terminates the incumbent
CEO and hires the replacement. Denote as α∗2(α0) the replacement’s ability level
which causes the firm to replace its incumbent CEO, i.e., for all α2 ≥ α
∗
2(α0),
the firm terminates an incumbent CEO with skill α0. The firm’s termination rule
α∗2(α0) is endogenously determined. The main case of interest is when there is
asymmetric information between the board and the analyst, i.e., when the analyst
does not observe the realization of α0. However, the analysis below also considers
the benchmark case of no information asymmetry regarding α0.
1.2.3 Information Collection, t=1
The analyst’s signal is CEO-specific. Examples of such CEO-specific information
would be developing a relationship with the firm’s CEO and management team and
forming an opinion of its competence, investigating the historical performance of
projects under the CEO’s tenure, or evaluating a strategy likely to be altered if the
CEO is replaced. In each of these cases, both the analyst’s information quality and
expected trading profits become less valuable if the CEO is terminated at t = 2, so
that she prefers to avoid collecting information about a CEO who appears likely to
be replaced. To formalize the CEO-specificity of the analyst’s signal, if the CEO is
not terminated at t = 2, the analyst’s has perfect information about ∆̃, i.e., β = 1.
If the CEO is terminated, β = p, where 0 < p < 1. When the analyst receives her
signal, she does not know whether her signal is informative or not.
The analyst benefits from her information by trading the firm’s stock at
t = 3. If prices fully reflect the analyst’s private information (z 6= 0), the analyst’s
trading profits are equal to zero. Instead, the analyst profits from uninformative
prices, those in which neither the market maker nor the firm can infer the analyst’s
signal. To characterize the expected profits from trading, consider an analyst who
receives a positive signal. Because she will submit a buy order, the range of possible
order flows are z ∈ {0,+1,+2}. With probability 13 , z = 0, affording the analyst
a profit of 1+2 β2 −
1
2 = β. The analyst’s expected profits are thus equal to
β
3 . The
analyst’s expected profits will be the same if she instead receives a negative signal.
In this case, the analyst sells the stock short, securing profits of 12 −
1−2 β
2 = β. Note
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that this event also occurs with probability 13 . Therefore, the analyst’s expected
trading profits, net of her costs of gathering information are β3 − k.
Recalling that β = 1 if the CEO is retained, it is obvious from that if k ≥ 13 ,
the analyst will never collect information, regardless of the probability the CEO is
replaced. Likewise, if k ≤ p3 , the analyst will always collect information, even for a
firm that is certain to fire and replace its CEO. I therefore focus on the interesting
case in which p3 < k <
1
3 , so that the analyst’s decision to collect information
depends on her expectation of the likelihood that the CEO is replaced.
1.2.4 Compensation, t=0
The board moves first at t = 0. After learning the CEO’s ability, α0, it offers
him a publicly observable wage C(α0), which is modeled as a bargaining game
between the board and CEO. To define the payoffs to each party in the t = 0 wage
negotiation, I make the following assumptions. First, the CEO has a reservation
wage normalized to zero, but has some bargaining power with his firm during the
wage negotiations at t = 0 denoted by ψ ∈ [0, 1]. The CEO’s bargaining power
specifies what fraction of the CEO’s marginal contribution to firm value he is able
to capture in his compensation. Second, I simplify the exposition by assuming that
the firm has all the bargaining power during t = 2 should it hire a replacement.5
The second assumption quantifies the firm’s threat point, or the continuation value
for the firm if negotiations with its CEO are not successful. Finally, I assume that
the CEO’s wage is settled at t = 0, and is publicly observable.
1.3 Equilibrium
I analyze the wage bargaining outcomes and termination rules under three different
information environments. As a benchmark case, in subsection 1.3.1, I first char-
acterize the compensation schedule if the analyst provides no information to the
firm about its investment opportunities. Next, in subsection 1.3.2, I analyze the
outcomes when the analyst provides valuable information about the firm’s assets,
but assume that the incumbent CEO’s talent, α0, is common knowledge at t = 0.
Finally, in subsection 1.3.3, I consider the case when the board is more informed
5Altering this assumption does not change the qualitative nature of the results.
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about his ability than the analyst. In this situation, the analyst infers the CEO’s
expected tenure from his compensation at t = 0, creating an incentive for firms to
use compensation strategically to signal the CEO’s talent.
1.3.1 Uninformative Analysts
Consider first the result of wage bargaining when the analyst’s investigation provides
no information to the firm about the productivity shock, i.e. β = 0. Because
analysts are assumed to provide the firm with no information about the profitability
shock affecting its assets, the firm will solve expression (3.1) with E[∆̃] = 0, resulting
in an expected cash flow of E[α2] +
1
2 . If wage negotiations fail, the firm expects to
hire a replacement at t = 2 with average ability E[α2] =
1
2 .
If however, negotiations are successful, the incumbent CEO accepts employ-
ment at t = 0. Although the firm’s investment policy is not altered by the success or
failure of t = 0 wage negotiations, the managerial component of firm value is clearly
improved by the presence of an incumbent CEO. Because the CEO contributes α0
to firm value, the firm will replace the incumbent CEO if the talent of the replace-
ment exceeds that of the incumbent, or if α2 ≥ α0. Given a termination cutoff



















Expression (1.6) reveals that a CEO of talent α0 affords his firm the option to be
selective at t = 2, increasing the value of the firm by
α20
2 . The improvement in firm
value is subject to bargaining. The CEO’s t = 0 wage is ψ times the surplus his




1.3.2 Informative Analysts, Observable CEO Talent
If, however, the analyst’s investigation is informative, then a high-ability CEO is
valued for an additional reason beyond his ability to directly enhance the firm’s cash
flows. A highly skilled CEO likely to enjoy a long tenure increases the incentive for
the analyst to collect long-lived CEO-specific information. Relative to the no-analyst
benchmark, this alters both the probability that the CEO is replaced as well as his
compensation.
Trading and Investment, t=3
Assuming that the analyst has investigated at t = 1 (the benefit is trivially zero
otherwise), the value of her information depends only on whether the incumbent
CEO is still employed at t = 3. Expression (1.2) quantifies the average improvement
in investment efficiency resulting from the analyst’s signal. Because the analyst’s
information declines by 1 − p if the CEO is terminated at t = 2, the firm therefore
expects to sacrifice (1−p)
2
3 if it replaces its CEO at t = 2.
Termination, t=2
This implies a stricter t = 2 termination rule, one that accounts for the lost value
of the analyst’s information:




The first term is identical to the no-analyst benchmark case, showing that replace-
ment occurs only if the replacement CEO is more talented than the incumbent.
The second term in expression (1.7) shows that because CEO-specific information
is destroyed during termination, the likelihood that the CEO is replaced is reduced.
The probability that the CEO is replaced increases with p. Low values of p mean
that the analyst’s information is highly CEO-specific, depreciating rapidly in the
event of replacement. Consequently, when p declines, retaining the CEO is more
attractive, all else equal.
Expression (1.7) also implies a critical value, αc, above which no CEO will be
replaced. Given that α2 is distributed on the unit interval, if expression (1.7) cannot
13
be satisfied when α∗2 = 1, then it will be impossible for a more skilled replacement
CEO to provide enough direct benefit to offset the accompanying loss in investment
efficiency. Any incumbent CEO with skill of at least αc = 1 − (1−p
2)
3 is assured of
being retained for the investment period.6
Information Collection, t=1
Consider now the analyst’s problem of choosing whether to collect information about
a firm employing an incumbent CEO with talent α0. As indicated above, if α0 ≥ α
C ,
the analyst will investigate and produce information because the CEO will certainly
be retained. If α0 < α
C , there is some probability that the CEO will be replaced,
so the analyst may or may not produce information. The analyst’s investigation








Setting expression (1.8) equal to k characterizes α̂, the minimum managerial skill
level for which the analyst will investigate,
α̂ =






Given the previous assumption that k < 13 , it follows directly that α̂ < α
C .
Thus, for α̂ ≤ α0 ≤ α
C , the analyst produces information even though with some
probability the firm replaces its CEO. Figure 1.2 summarizes what actions the board
and analyst take for these ability cutoffs.
As in the last subsection, I focus on the interesting case in which the analyst’s
decision to collect information depends on her expectation of whether the CEO
6This cutoff is an artifact of a bounded distribution for abilities. If instead the CEO’s skill had
unbounded positive support, more talented CEOs would be less likely to be terminated, without
there being a bound above which termination would never occur. This cutoff value is neither
important for the model, nor a focus of the results.
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α0 = 0
CEO may be replaced
α̂
analyst investigates
αC α0 = 1
Figure 1.2: Board and Analyst Actions as Functions of CEO Talent
will be retained or not.7 Without such an assumption, the analyst will produce
information for all firms, so that there is no motivation to signal the CEO’s ability.
Compensation, t=0
The CEO’s compensation in the region where α0 < α̂, corresponds to the no-analyst
case already discussed in the previous subsection, in which C(α0) = ψ
α20
2 . It is
straightforward to show that in the rightmost region of Figure 1.2 (αC ≤ α0), the




Most interesting is the middle region, α̂ ≤ α0 ≤ α
C , where the CEO creates



















The first term corresponds to the case in which the CEO is terminated.
captures the fact that replacing an incumbent CEO is associated with both a cost
and a benefit. Although the firm enjoys the rents associated with a more talented
CEO, its stock price is less informative, reducing its investment efficiency. The
7Formally, this assumption is 1+2 p−p
2+p3
9
< k, which is stronger than p
3
< k, the corresponding
assumption in the previous subsection. The reason a stronger assumption is needed is because the
analyst’s investigation increases the incumbent CEO’s value to the firm, which in turn reduces the
probability that he is terminated.
8Knowing that the CEO will never be replaced, the firm expects to reap the full value of the
analyst’s information, 1
3






two terms represent the expected direct improvement due to the CEO’s talent, and the third term
represents the value created through improved investment efficiency. The CEO’s compensation





reverse is true if the firm retains its CEO, shown in the second term. Substituting















The first term in expression (1.11) is the value the incumbent CEO adds
by affording the firm the option to be more selective in its replacement choice, as
in the previous subsection. The second and third terms capture the value created
by the analyst’s information, which allows the firm to invest more efficiently in the
production period.
Discussion
Figure 1.3 below graphs the CEO’s t = 0 compensation, C(α0), for α0 ≤ α
C . The
solid line shows the CEO’s compensation as a function of his ability, α0, when ability
is observable. The dashed line, shown for comparison, is the CEO’s compensation
in the no-analyst case.
C( )
^ C
Figure 1.3: Compensation as a Function of CEO Talent
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Two observations stand out in Figure 1.3. The first is the discontinuity at
α̂, representing a discrete improvement conferred to the firm when the analyst ini-
tiates coverage. The second is that the slope of the compensation schedule increase
faster with CEO-specific information (dark line) than without (dashed line). In
other words, firms employing CEOs of different abilities place different values on
the analyst’s information. Because the analyst’s information is more valuable if the
firms retains its incumbent, a firm employing a high-ability CEO expects to realize
the full benefit of the analysts’s information. This leads to a compensation schedule
that increases more sharply with α0 than in the no-analyst case.
The remaining comparative statics of C(α0) are intuitively sensible. Com-
pensation becomes more expensive with ψ, a straightforward result of the CEO’s
bargaining power in wage negotiations. Additionally, the CEO’s wage is higher if
the analyst’s information is less CEO-specific, i.e., when p increases.9 This results
from the firm being able to invest more efficiently even if it replaces its CEO. Inter-
estingly, an increase in p improves firm value by more for firms with poorly talented
CEOs than those with richly talented CEOs. The reason is that p captures how
much information is lost in the event that the CEO is replaced. For firms that are
relatively certain to retain their CEOs, this is not particularly important.
1.3.3 Unobservable CEO Talent
Until now, when the CEO’s ability has been observable, bargaining alone has deter-
mined his compensation. When the board knows more about the CEO’s talent than
does the analyst, this is no longer the case. Because the analyst uses the CEO’s
compensation to infer his expected tenure, the board can use CEO compensation
strategically to influence the analyst’s beliefs about CEO talent. I now show that
under some circumstances, the board offers the CEO a higher wage than bargaining
alone would indicate.
To understand why the bargaining outcome displayed in Figure 1.3 can no
longer be an equilibrium if the analyst cannot directly observe the CEO’s talent,
consider the incentives of a firm employing a CEO with talent α0 slightly below α̂.
9The sign of the derivative of expression (1.11) is not obviously positive as claimed. However,
recall that expression (1.11) refers only to the compensation offered in the region between α̂ and
αC . The derivative of expression (1.11) with respect to p is positive if and only if p2 ≥ 3α0 − 2.
However, since α0 ≤ α







If it pays ψ α20 (the dashed line), it reveals itself as below the talent threshold for the
analyst to investigate. It could, however, spur the analyst to produce information
by paying C(α̂), as defined in expression (1.11) and shown in Figure 1.3. By paying
the CEO as though he were more talented than he actually is, the board causes the
analyst to overestimate the CEO’s expected tenure, causing him to overinvest in
collecting information.
As long as ψ < 1, so that the firm enjoys some portion of the improvement
in firm value associated with the initiation of analyst coverage, a firm sufficiently
close to α̂ will always find it optimal to pay the inflated compensation. However
as α0 decreases from α̂, two things occur. First, the firm becomes less valuable,
meaning that to attract analyst coverage, the CEO must be paid a higher fraction
of the firm’s value. Second, since CEOs with low talent are likely to be terminated,
the analyst’s information becomes less valuable, reducing the board’s incentive to
signal. In equilibrium, the firm will be indifferent between paying its CEO ψ
α20
2 ,
thereby revealing his talent as below α̂, and paying a compensation that attracts
the investigation of the analyst.
Characterizing the Equilibrium
I solve for and characterize a pure strategy equilibrium of the resulting signaling
game. Definition 1 below characterizes the equilibrium concept I use for the re-
mainder of the paper.
Definition 1 A pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a compensation sched-
ule offered by the firm C∗(α0) : [0, 1] → ℜ
+ and an information gathering strategy
by the analyst I∗(C∗(α0)) : ℜ
+ → {0, 1} such that: i) given I∗(C∗(α0)), the ex-
pected firm value for a firm paying its CEO C∗(α0), V (C
∗(α0)), is at least as large
as V (C(α0)) for any other compensation schedule C(α0) 6= C
∗(α0), and ii) given
C∗(α0), the analyst collects information (I = 1) and trades if his expected trading
profits, conditional on C∗(α0), at least offset his costs of gathering private informa-
tion.
Relative to the compensation schedule when the CEO’s talent is observable
(Figure 1.3), the compensation schedule with unobservable talent reflects the incen-
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tive of firms with poorly talented CEOs to not reveal this information to analysts.
Unlike Figure 1.3, in which compensation maps one-to-one to CEO talent, the in-
centive of firms with poorly talented CEOs to influence the analyst’s beliefs implies
a range of talent levels [αM , αP ] that all pay the same compensation, such that
the analyst cannot perfectly infer the CEO’s expected tenure. Recalling that the
analyst breaks even at α̂ under full information, but enjoys strictly positive (nega-
tive) expected profits for talent levels above (below) α̂, it must be the case that the
αM < α̂ < αP .
The cutoffs αM and αP depend respectively on the optimal strategies of the
firm and analyst. In equilibrium, a firm employing a CEO with talent αM will be
indifferent between: 1) paying C(αP ) and reaping the benefit of the analyst’s infor-
mation, and 2) paying ψ
α2
M
2 , but foregoing the benefit of the analyst’s investigation.
In equilibrium, the benefit of the analyst’s information for the firm with marginal
CEO skill αM ,
























Equating expressions (1.12) and (1.13) does not pin down the values of αM
and αP . For this, it is necessary to consider the analyst’s participation constraint.
Because the analyst will lose money in expectation for αM ≤ α0 ≤ α̂, these expected
losses must be offset by trading profits for the interval α̂ ≤ α0 ≤ αP . The analyst’s
























) ≥ k. (1.14)
Because the analyst’s beliefs will be correct in equilibrium, expression (1.14)
reveals that the analyst’s beliefs about αP and αM influence the equilibrium values of
these cutoffs. Specifically, because firms correctly anticipate how the compensation
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they offer their CEOs will influence the analyst’s behavior, the analyst’s beliefs
about αP and αM will influence firms’ compensation decisions.
I focus on the signaling equilibrium in which the analyst’s costs of collecting
information exactly offset his expected profits over the signaling region. For example,
there exist equilibria in which expression (1.14) does not hold with equality, ones in
which the analyst’s expected profits are positive over the interval αM ≤ α0 ≤ αP .
All of these equilibria involves signaling the CEO’s ability via overpayment. I focus
on the equilibrium in which the analyst breaks even for tractability and relatively











Equating (1.12) and (1.13) and substituting equation (1.15) pins down the
values of αM and αP , completing the signaling equilibrium compensation schedule.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique signaling equilibrium in pure strategies to the
game with unobservable CEO talent in which a strictly positive set of firms employing
a CEO with talent αM ≤ α0 ≤ αP where αM < αP pay the same compensation








18 ], and in which the analyst breaks even over
αM ≤ α0 ≤ αP . If α0 < αM or α0 > αP , the firm pays the same compensation as
it would were CEO talent observable (displayed to Figure 1.3). The analyst collects
information for all firms that pay at least C(αP ), and does not gather information
otherwise.
Proof: Suppose α0 < αM . At α0 = αM , the benefit of the analyst’s infor-
mation to shareholders (expression (1.12)) is exactly offset by the cost (expression
(1.13)). Since the benefit strictly increases with α0 and the cost strictly decreases
with α0, any firm employing a CEO with talent below αM is made strictly worse by
paying any compensation above ψ
α20
2 .
Suppose α0 > αP . Since all firms in this region will already generate in-
formation collection by analysts, there is no motivation to attempt to influence the
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analyst’s beliefs about the CEO’s talent. Compensation in this region is determined
by bargaining, as in the case when CEO talent is observable.
Suppose αM ≤ α0 ≤ αP . Paying any compensation less than C(αP ) would
result in the analyst not collecting information for the firm, which is strictly dom-
inated by paying C(αP ) for any firm employing a CEO with talent of at least αM .
Paying any compensation greater than C(αP ) transfers wealth to the CEO without
any accompanying benefit.
Q.E.D.
The signaling equilibrium described above is one in which some boards pro-
mote their CEOs as ‘superstars,’ even if they are not. Figure 1.4 plots the equi-
librium compensation schedule for all three scenarios: no analyst, observable CEO
talent, and unobservable CEO talent. To gain some intuition regarding the shape
of Figure 1.4, consider that any firm with the incentive to signal its CEO’s tal-








18 ], because the analyst will not collect information for
talent levels below this threshold.
However, C(α̂) may contain no mass in equilibrium, because the analyst’s
expected profits with any compensation pooling at C(α̂) will be strictly negative.10
If the analyst plays a pure strategy, then his expected profits must at least offset
his costs of gathering information for every compensation level for which he collects
information. Thus, any compensation level where pooling includes CEOs below α̂
(for which the analyst’s expected trading profits are negative) must also include
CEOs with talent above α̂ (for which the analyst’s expected trading profits are
positive).
The first important observation from Figure 1.4 is that relative to the case
when talent is observable, the compensation is shifted upward for talent levels in
the neighborhood of α̂. Specifically, between αM and αP , all firms pay the same
compensation, which prevents the analyst from inferring either the talent of the CEO
or the likelihood he is replaced. In effect, shareholders whose CEO is just below α̂
are sacrificing some of their bargaining power to the CEO during wage negotiations.








 not observable 
No analyst
Figure 1.4: Compensation Schedule for All Three Cases
Although this means that wealth is transferred to the CEO, because the firm’s stock
price is more informative, the improved investment more than offsets this cost to
shareholders. In addition, the analyst’s expected profits are reduced. When CEO
talent is observable, the analyst’s expected net trading profits are strictly greater
than zero for any talent level strictly above α̂. With unobservable CEO talent, his
expected profits are exactly zero for αM ≥ α0 ≥ αP , and are again strictly positive
above αP . Since αP > α̂, the analyst’s expected profits are strictly lower when he
must use compensation to infer the expected tenure of the CEO.
Comparative Statics
In this subsection, I examine how the equilibrium fraction of firms that strategically
overpay their managers is affected by variation in the analyst’s information collection
cost (k), the manager’s bargaining power in wage negotiation (ψ), and the CEO-
specificity of the analyst’s signal (p). If more firms find strategic overpayment
worthwhile, the horizontal portion of Figure 1.4 will be both longer (along the
α0 axis) and higher (along the C(α0) axis). As the fraction of overpaying firms
decreases to zero, Figure 1.4 collapses to Figure 1.3, where the CEO’s talent is
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observable.
Proposition 2 Firms whose CEOs have talent α0 ∈ [αm, αP ] overpay relative to
the bargaining solution. The fraction of such firms, αP − αM : i) increases as the
analyst’s cost of collecting information, k, decreases, ii) increases as the CEO’s bar-
gaining power, ψ, decreases, and iii) may either increase or decrease as the analyst’s
information becomes more CEO-specific.
Analyst’s Cost of Gathering Information. When k increases, the an-
alyst demands higher expected profits to compensate him for his increased cost of
gathering information. Because the analyst’s expected profits increase with α0, an
increase in k causes the analyst to become more selective about the firms he covers,
i.e., shifting α̂ to the right and producing information for firms with very talented
CEOs who are unlikely to be replaced. Such an increase in α̂ has the unambiguous
effect of decreasing the fraction of firms that signal via overpayment. The reason for
this is due to the convexity of the CEO compensation schedule, as seen in Figures
1.3 and 1.4.11 Even though the benefit of signaling also increases with the CEO’s
talent, the fact that “superstar” CEOs are compensated so generously means that
it is increasingly costly to signal as α̂ shifts to the right. In other words, an increase
in k will increase both α̂ and αM to the right, but because the cost of signaling
increases faster than the associated benefit, αM shifts by more than α̂. This results
in fewer firms signaling when the analyst’s information is expensive to collect.
CEO Bargaining Power. A related effect is found with respect to the
CEO’s bargaining power in wage negotiation (ψ), although the reasons differ sig-
nificantly. Inspection of expression (1.15) reveals that α̂ does not depend on ψ,
which is sensible given that the analyst’s expected trading profits depend only the
CEO’s expected tenure and the characteristics of the analyst’s information. Thus,
an increase in ψ does not impact the analyst’s break-even CEO talent level. It
does, however, increase the relative cost required to mimic the compensation offered
to more talented CEOs (i.e., in Figure 1.3, an increase in ψ would shift the entire
compensation schedule up by a factor). The convexity of the compensation schedule
11Recall that this convexity arises through the optionality associated with hiring an incumbent
CEO (see subsection 1.3.1 for more discussion).
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means that an increase in ψ increases the cost of strategic overpayment, but confers
no additional benefit.
In the limit when ψ increases to one, the width of the horizontal line in Figure
1.4, representing the fraction of firms engaging in strategic overpayment, decreases
to zero. This is intuitively sensible. Strategic overpayment amounts to the board
sacrificing more than the bargaining solution would prescribe. If a highly talented
CEO is able to capture the entire surplus his presence creates, then strategic over-
payment by firms with a less talented CEO would be strictly dominated. Because
the value created by a less talented CEO is strictly less than the value created by
a more talented CEO, overpayment would always destroy more value than it would
create.
CEO-specificity of the Analyst’s Information. Finally, consider how an
increase in p, the inverse of the CEO-specificity of the analyst’s information, affects
the equilibrium. Examination of expression (1.11) reveals that although an increase
in p is valuable to all firms (since stock prices will be more informative in case the
CEO is replaced), it is more valuable to firms employing CEOs with low talent.
This implies that the benefit of strategic overpayment given in expression (1.12)
increases with p faster than does the cost required to attract analyst attention given
in expression (1.13). All else equal, this would increase the fraction of strategically
overpaying firms.
However, there is another effect that may either reinforce or diminish this
effect. As noted above, if α̂ decreases, then this decreases the signaling cost required
to attract the analyst’s attention. In this case, an increase in p both increases the
benefit and decreases the cost of strategic overpayment, which will increase the
number of firms that pool at C(αP ). On the other hand, if p increases α̂ by enough
such that the increased cost sufficiently offsets the increased benefit, fewer firms will
overpay their CEOs in equilibrium. Inspection of expression (1.9) reveals that for
sufficiently low values of k, ∂α̂
∂p
< 0, so that increases in p increase the fraction of
strategically overpaying firms. For higher values of k, the impact of p is ambiguous.12






In trying to identify situations in which strategic overpayment may play a meaningful
role in determining CEO compensation, it is useful to revisit the key assumptions of
the model. Of particular significance is the assumption that the analysts is reluctant
to produce information that has little value if the CEO is terminated, implying that
a firm likely to terminate its CEO may not have access to high quality external
information about its projects. When is this likely to be a concern for an analyst?
Clearly, timing is of first-order importance. In industries where projects are
short-lived, the analyst’s ability to profit from his information is less dependent on
the CEO having a long tenure. Instead, signaling is comparatively more important
when the analyst’s information has time to depreciate if the CEO is replaced, leading
him to be more discriminating about the firms he investigates. A second factor
that influences signaling is how much influence a CEO has in determining his firm’s
strategy. In quickly-evolving and flexible industries, for example, different CEOs are
likely to have different “visions” for their respective firms, leading them to pursue
different operating plans. It is these situations where an analyst, having investigated
the strategy advanced by a previous CEO, may not be able to apply his information
to the strategy advanced by the replacement.
Also worthy of discussion is the assumption that the board knows more about
the CEO’s talent than does the market. Given the board’s direct and repeated
interaction with the CEO, taking this assumption literally is probably reasonable,
especially for young CEOs with little track record for the market to evaluate. This
does not, however, mean that signaling cannot play a role with more seasoned
managers. Although the market can learn about the general ability of experienced
CEOs by observing their performance over time, a CEO’s “fit” or firm-specific skills
are likely to both evolve over time as well as be more difficult to infer. For example,
how a CEO deals with internal strife within his management team likely plays a large
role in his job security. This and similar issues imply that the board’s assessment
of the CEO can play an important role, although the effect may be magnified for
younger managers.
The primary implication of strategic overpayment is that higher levels of
CEO compensation should result in more information being produced about the
firm’s prospects. Second, strategic overpayment clearly increases the average wage
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within an industry, as seen in Figure 1.4. Third, and more importantly from the
analyst’s perspective, signaling weakens the link between CEO compensation and
his probability of being terminated. In contrast to Figure 1.3, where a CEO’s
compensation directly reflects his expected tenure, strategic overpayment means
that even a board with a low opinion of its CEO may find the increase in stock price
efficiency worth the signaling cost. This implies that in the strategic overpayment
equilibrium, the CEO’s compensation should be a less powerful predictor of his
tenure.
Extensions
Size. In my model, firms are identical in size. However, as is documented empir-
ically and shown theoretically in Gabaix and Landier (2006), size is an important
determinant of CEO pay. Incorporating this feature into my current framework is
straightforward, and delivers the standard prediction that larger firms more gener-
ously compensate their top executives. In Gabaix and Landier (2006), size interacts
directly with the CEO’s skill, so that the marginal impact of ability is higher for
larger firms. The implication in my model is similar. Larger firms invest more
intensively, increasing the value of the analyst’s information and making highly tal-
ented CEOs very valuable and well compensated. Since the analyst’s information
is more valuable to large firms, they would also have a higher incentive to signal.
All else equal, this would increase the fraction of firms that would find strategic
overpayment of the CEO attractive.
However, a rigorous treatment of size in the context of my model would re-
quire altering the assumption of constant liquidity among firms of different sizes.
Because larger firms have more liquid stocks, the analyst’s incentive to gather in-
formation is higher, which would reduce a firm’s incentive to signal. Thus, while
the larger scale of firms means that the incentive to attract analyst attention is
increased, it is unclear whether signaling would play a larger or smaller role in CEO
compensation at big firms.
Financial Flexibility. Firms benefit from the analyst’s information through
more efficient investment. Allowing for financing constraints in the model would
deliver the prediction that less flexible firms are less likely to engage in strategic
overpayment. The intuition is that if a firm does not have the investment flexibility
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to take advantage of the analyst’s information, then there is little motivation to
signal via compensation. This would imply that highly leveraged firms, whose op-
erating plans are constrained by their financial inflexibility, may be less inclined to
signal their CEO’s ability. There are, however, other reasons why highly leveraged
firms may pay their CEOs less, perhaps most importantly because a history of poor
performance may have resulted in the firm’s excessive leverage.
Governance. Boards are not weak or strong in my model, but may inten-
tionally “sacrifice” some of their bargaining power to the CEO by paying him a
higher wage than the bargaining solution would indicate. Core, Holthausen, and
Larcker (1999) shows that a board’s structure, which likely provides information
about the CEO’s relative bargaining power, impacts compensation.13 A direct in-
terpretation of my model is that a sacrifice of such bargaining power, to the extent
that it results in a heightened perception of the CEO’s ability or job security, can
be beneficial.
A less direct but related interpretation of the model is that a board may have
an incentive to understate its willingness to terminate the CEO. Powerful boards
with the ability and willingness to fire the CEO in the wake of poor performance
may, for the reasons detailed in the model, reduce the incentives of analysts and
other stakeholders to make investments that depend on the CEO’s tenure. This in-
terpretation would require that weak boards both pay their CEOs more handsomely
and be less likely to terminate him. It would also require that more powerful boards
downplay to the market their willingness to discipline the CEO. While this line of
reasoning is unlikely to be of first order importance, it nevertheless highlights a po-
tential benefit of appearing weakly governed, which may play a role in determining
CEO compensation.
Other Stakeholders. The model primarily addresses the interaction be-
tween the firm and analyst community, but its interpretation may extend to other
of the firm’s relationships as well. For example, workers are often expected to make
investments in skills and knowledge that depend upon a particular strategy em-
braced by the firm’s top management. If these investments in human capital do not
pay off immediately, then the investments of workers may depend on their percep-
tions of the CEO’s support from the board and shareholders. The same may be
13Board structure refers to such characteristics as its size, the fraction of seats held by outsiders,
and whether the CEO is the chairman.
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said for others with an interest in the firm’s long-term viability, such as suppliers or
customers.
1.4 Conclusion
I develop a model in which the board may find it optimal to overstate its support of
the CEO. Because the analyst is likely to produce better quality information if the
CEO is supported by the board, the firm benefits from a perception that its CEO’s
job is safe. To the extent that compensation communicates the board’s support
of the CEO, the board may therefore have the incentive to overpay the CEO. The
model applies to situations in which the analyst’s benefit from collecting information
is diminished if the CEO is replaced. This is likely to be the case in industries where
projects do not pay off quickly, as well as those in which CEOs play a large role
in determining the strategies of their respective firms. The model shows that more
firms engage in signaling when the CEO’s bargaining power is low, and when the
analyst’s cost of collecting information is small.
Implicit in the model is that the board can only signal its support of the
CEO through his compensation, although there are certainly other ways in which
this support can be conveyed.14 My model focuses on compensation for two main
reasons. First, unlike the structure of the CEO’s severance agreement, the “inde-
pendence” of the board’s directors, or other evidence providing information about
the CEO’s likelihood of being replaced, the CEO’s compensation is easily observ-
able. Second, the CEO’s compensation is determined after an extensive evaluation
process, and is therefore likely to reflect the board’s private information about the
CEO’s talent or specific “fit” with the firm, and therefore contribution to firm value.
Since a board is likely to remain supportive of a CEO it views as more talented, the
CEO’s compensation likely provides analysts with insight into the board’s likelihood
of replacing its CEO.
Finally, although the model specifically addresses CEO termination and the
impact this possibility has on the analyst’s incentives to collect information, the
14For example, Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2006) present evidence that CEO employment
contracts are highly variable with respect to the definition of termination for “just cause.” In
extreme cases, termination for cause would only occur if the CEO were indicted on a felony that
harmed the company.
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board’s actions need not be this extreme for the model’s implications to hold. For
example, if the board simply interferes with or alters the CEO’s strategy after the
analyst has collected information, then the analyst’s ex ante incentives to collect
information may be reduced. To the extent that compensation reflects a CEO’s
bargaining power in wage negotiations, it may also reflect the CEO’s ability to




Empirical Evidence on the
CEO’s Tenure, Impact on Firm
Strategy, and Relationship with
the Board
2.1 Introduction
The main result of the model developed in Chapter 1 pertains to the firm’s gov-
ernance, specifically the optimal (perceived) balance of power between the firm’s
board and CEO. However, the story indirectly involves several additional players,
and makes important assumptions about their behavior, preferences, and payoffs.
This purpose of this chapter is to further develop the model’s intuition by discussing
several of these key parties and assumptions, and when possible, presenting support-
ive empirical evidence.
One of the model’s important assumptions is that CEO turnover represents
a legitimate threat to stakeholders, because any ensuing strategic changes may re-
duce the value of strategic-specific investments. This connection is crucial for the
model - unless some aspects of the firm’s competitive strategy are altered by new
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management, CEOs are merely figureheads with little power to influence stakeholder
investments. Empirical evidence strongly suggests the contrary, i.e., that CEOs do
in fact play large roles in guiding their firms’ strategies. For example, stock price
volatility significantly increases around CEO turnover, an effect more pronounced
when the CEO is replaced by someone outside the organization. Real investments
and operating efficiency are also affected by regime change, supporting the assump-
tion that CEOs appear to heavily influence the direction of their firms. Section 2.2
summarizes empirical work on this area.
However, top executives must be replaced often enough so that the poten-
tial for termination is an important consideration for analysts and the firm’s other
stakeholders when making their investment decisions. Section 2.3 addresses this
question directly, first providing empirical evidence that the CEO is an increasingly
risky position, and then presenting reasons for this trend including more stringent
corporate governance, the changing nature of responsibilities, and a more efficient
labor market.
Although the model’s intuition applies to any of the firm’s stakeholders, the
model specifically addresses the problem of an investor attempting to decide whether
to collect costly CEO-specific information about the firm. Section 2.4 explores in
more detail one type of investor - a stock analyst. Analyst coverage can certainly
benefit the firm directly, for instance by increasing the firm’s long-term credibility
with the investment community, increasing its access to financing. There are various
indirect benefits as well, such as when the firm uses information produced by analysts
to improve its decision making. Section 2.4 also presents evidence that the value of
the analyst’s information is often tied to a particular firm or management team, so
that the potential for regime change may impact the analyst’s ex ante incentives to
collect information.
Finally, Section 2.5 explores various ways that a board may communicate
its confidence in the CEO, improving firm value by increasing his credibility with
analysts and other stakeholders. First, I briefly discuss why commitment mecha-
nisms such as long-term contracts and severance agreements may be effective, as
well as describe their shortcomings. Following that is a discussion of how the board
can use observable signals to communicate its confidence in the CEO’s capabilities.
Although other potential signals are discussed, I devote special attention to the
role of the CEO’s compensation as credible signal of the board’s assessment of his
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capabilities. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 CEO and Firm Strategy
The CEO is a unique employee. In addition to being the most public figure in the
firm, the CEO is generally expected to provide and articulate a strategic “vision” for
the firm, i.e., a set of long-range plans and operational goals expected to define the
firm’s competitive strategy. For example, which markets the firm plans to target,
how intensively it invests, or whether or not it acquires a rival are the types of high-
level decisions likely to be influenced by the CEO’s particular vision for the firm.
That the CEO’s strategy is well-understood is important, not only for those inside
the firm, but also for parties outside the firm such as the firm’s stakeholders and
analyst community, parties that allow it to execute the strategy more effectively.
However, because the CEO’s vision for his firm is often imperfect, it is not
uncommon for firms to alter their strategies. While the CEO himself will sometimes
revisit his initial strategy in light of new information, such changes – especially
when the CEO’s initial strategy was particularly high profile – are often initiated by
the board against the CEO’s wishes. The financial press is littered with examples
where the CEO was either forced to abandon a major initiative such as a merger,
or in extreme circumstances, was terminated by the board after the CEO’s strategy
failed to meet expectations. For example, “a strategy that appeared to pull the
company in opposite directions” was explicitly cited as the reason former Compaq
CEO Eckhard Pfeiffer was sacked by his board. Time will tell whether the well
publicized strategy failures at Motorola will cost Ed Zander his position.1
To the extent that boards initiate strategy change by replacing CEOs, top
executive turnover should be associated with measurable changes in, e.g., the firm’s
investment policy, efficiency, or other strategy-related characteristics. Denis and
Denis (1995) study a sample of 721 CEO turnovers (83 forced) during the mid-
1980s. They find that operating performance and investment policy is significantly
altered when a CEO is replaced, an effect that is more pronounced in the event
of a forced departure. In both normal and forced retirements, the median ratio of
1According to the Financial Times Online August 23, 2007, Nomura analyst said, “We think
that Motorola has made a strategic blunder by giving up a long-term opportunity for short-term
profits. If Motorola doesn’t see a pick-up in the next two quarters, we may see a new CEO.”
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operating income before depreciation to total assets (OIBD/TA) improves. However,
the effect of forced retirements is much larger, approximating the magnitude of
efficiency improvement following management buyouts (Kaplan (1989)), leveraged
recapitalizations (Denis and Denis (1993)), and proxy contests Mulherin and Poulsen
(1994)).
Weisbach (1995) examines firms’ investment decisions around CEO turnover.
He finds that the probability of a firm divesting a poorly performing asset depends on
whether the asset was acquired under the current or previous CEO’s tenure. As asset
inherited by the CEO is more likely to be sold than if purchased during his tenure,
an effect that is invariant to the type of turnover, i.e., forced or voluntary. This
result is consistent with similar evidence from Denis and Denis (1995), who find that
industry-adjusted changes in total assets, employees, and capital expenditures are all
significantly negative in the forced CEO turnover sample. Consistent with strategy
changes being comparatively mild, the effect is less pronounced during regular, i.e.,
non-forced, retirements. Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2004) extend the work of Denis
and Denis to consider how monitoring mechanisms such as institutional holdings or
board composition influence performance changes around CEO turnover. Although
their overall results confirm the findings of Denis and Denis (1995), they do not find
that forced turnovers predict more drastic operating performance changes.
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) assess the importance of individual managers
through a different empirical technique. Rather than analyze firm performance
around CEO turnover, the authors show that a wide array of firm-level characteris-
tics can be explained by CEO fixed-effects. Examining a data set spanning over 30
years (1969-1999), the authors are able to separately identify firm and CEO fixed
effects by observing the behavior of specific managers across several firms. They
find that CEO fixed-effects matter, particularly with regard to acquisition and di-
vestiture decisions, interest coverage, and dividend policy. Moreover, the authors
identify specific characteristics that may be responsible for driving the fixed effects,
such as the CEO’s birth cohort or educational background. Overall, the results
of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) overwhelmingly suggest that CEOs matter for firm
policy and strategy.
The strategy changes and efficiency improvements accompanying forced CEO
turnover impact stock prices as well. Bonnier and Bruner (1989), Furtado and
Rozeff (1987), and Weisbach (1988) all find significant price reactions surrounding
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CEO changes. Denis and Denis (1995) find a positive effect only around forced
turnover, while Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) find insignificant price reactions.
While these results can be explained through efficiency improvements not necessarily
linked to strategy changes, Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg (2005) find that equity
volatility increases around CEO turnover. This effect is most pronounced for forced
turnover, a finding the authors interpret as “consistent with the view that forced
departures imply a higher probability of large strategy changes.”
In aggregate, this body of evidence suggests that selecting a replacement
CEO is a complex task. The board must not only “be able to identify and attract
superior replacement managers (Denis and Denis, 1995),” but must also anticipate
the disruptions associated with transitioning management. Clearly, such disruptions
can vary in severity, depending on how much the new CEO intends to alter the firm’s
competitive strategy and operations. CEOs hired from within are more likely to
maintain the status quo, not only because they already possess experience under that
regime, but also because internal promotions are likely not random. For example,
a board pleased with the firm’s overall strategy, but displeased with the CEO’s
behavior or ability to execute the strategy, may be apt to hire from within. On the
other hand, a board wishing to implement more drastic changes may find external
replacements more suitable.
2.3 Corporate Governance and CEO Job Security
The threat of dismissal is perhaps the most severe penalty a board can exact upon
a poorly performing member of its management team. With the dramatic increase
in performance-sensitive compensation for CEOs, it might be supposed that better
incentive alignment between managers and shareholders would lead to less termi-
nation and longer tenure for top executives.2 Instead, CEOs appear to face more
turnover risk than ever. In fact, a growing body of empirical evidence now suggests
that along with the notoriety and fortune often associated with leading a firm comes
additional scrutiny, heightened accountability, and decreased job security.
2Frydman and Saks (2007) analyze long-term trends in CEO pay, finding that compensation
has become more sensitive to firm performance. For example, cash bonuses tied to performance
increased from less than 1 percent in the 1940s to more than 25 percent recently. Options have also
grown in every decade since the 1950s, comprising about half of CEO pay in 2000.
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The most recent large-scale study of CEO turnover is Kaplan and Minton
(2006), which finds an annual turnover risk for CEOs of 14.9% during 1992-2005.
Importantly, the study finds that CEOs are replaced more frequently in the latter
part of the sample, increasingly from 12.7% per year during 1992-1997 to 16.5% dur-
ing 1998-2005. These estimates of turnover are slightly higher than those found in
previous periods.3 Perhaps more importantly however, the timing of these turnovers
suggests that boards are properly motivated; CEO termination is increasingly linked
to performance, measured both at the firm and industry level. This finding contrasts
with Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), which, in an earlier sample (1971-1994),
finds no detectable trend in performance-turnover sensitivity. Kaplan and Minton
(2006) interpret their more recent finding as evidence of increasingly effective gover-
nance, a welcome source of value creation in the wake of recent governance scandals.4
While CEO-firm separations are relatively easy to identify, a significant ob-
stacle in quantifying termination risk, i.e., forced departures, is that the majority
of CEO firings are not disclosed as such. The convention usually adopted begins
with Parrino (1997), who classifies CEO turnover as forced if either: 1) the media
(Parrino uses news mentions in the Wall Street Journal) recognizes it as such, or 2)
the CEO leaves before age 60, but an explicit reason is not given, e.g., poor health,
assuming another position, etc., or 3) retires suddenly (without at least 6 months no-
tice). Using this classification, Parrino studies 977 CEO successions from 1969-1989,
finding that 13% of departures were forced. Importantly, whether the replacement
CEO is hired from outside the firm depends heavily on firm performance. When
the CEO leaves voluntarily, over 90% of the replacements are insiders, compared to
50% if the CEO is forced out.
Although the trend of increasing termination risk for CEO is relatively well
established, no clear consensus has emerged as to why this pattern exists. More ef-
fective corporate governance appears to be at least part of the answer, with boards
becoming both smaller and more independent, presumably leading to better align-
ment of director and shareholder interests. Weisbach (1988) is the first to investi-
gate the connection between board composition and termination risk. He finds that
3Khurana (2003) and Murphy and Zabonjik (2004) both report overall turnover rates of about
10% per year in the last three decades, increasing slightly in the 1990s. Parrino, Sias, and Starks
(2004) find turnover rates of approximately 20%. Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004) also finds
modest increases in overall turnover risk in the 1990s compared to the previous two decades.
4See Karaoglu, Sandino, and Beatty (2006) for several examples.
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boards dominated by those inside the firm (insiders) are less likely to terminate the
CEO after poor performance.5 Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2003) document a dramatic
decline in the fraction of corporate insiders sitting on boards. From 1980 - 2000, the
fraction of inside directors decreased from 33% to 16%. Similarly, evidence suggests
that boards are becoming smaller. These pieces of evidence suggest that modern
CEOs are subject to greater discipline by directors, increasing the pressure of CEOs
to perform.
A second factor owes to the changing nature of the CEO’s job itself. For
example, Gabaix and Landier (2007) document that firms have become much larger
over time.6 In their model, each firm’s overall productivity depends on both its scale
(size) and its CEO’s ability, implying that the most able managers should manage
the largest firms, where their contribution to value is highest. The main reason for
rapid CEO compensation in the last three decades, the authors argue, is simply that
firms have gotten much larger, increasing CEO productivity and compensation.
Though not the main focus of their paper, the extension to turnover is
straightforward. If the rank ordering of firm size is not constant over time, then there
will be (at least occasional) reshuffling among CEOs to preserve the match between
executive talent and firm size. In the absence of hiring and firing frictions, CEOs
are reshuffled whenever a firm overtakes or is overtaken by one of its counterparts.
However, if firms face transition costs of replacing their CEOs, the threshold for re-
placement is increased (i.e., larger differences between incumbent and replacement
CEO talent are required), so that replacements become somewhat less common.7
An economy-wide increase in firm size, such as documented by Gabaix and Landier
(2007), makes a clear prediction about the rate of CEO reshuffling. Because firms
are larger, small shocks for example, in product demand, imply large differences for
firm value. This is turn increases the importance of having a CEO whose talent
matches the firm’s size, so that CEO reshuffling should be more frequent when firms
are, on average, larger.
Another example comes from Allayannis, Rountree, and Weston (2007), who
document that because firms are going public earlier in their life cycles, modern
5Other related work includes Yermack (2004), who shows a negative relationship between sev-
erance packages and board independence. Core et al. (1999) and Lambert et al. (1993) show a
similar relationship between board independence and on-the-job compensation.
6For example, the asset values of Fortune 500 firms have increased by a factor of 5 (500%).
7This is modeled explicitly in Hallman, Hartzell, and Parsons (2007).
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CEOs are leading younger firms. The fact that young firms typically derive more
of their value from growth options as opposed to asset-in-place imply high effective
leverage (even in the absence of financial leverage). In addition, young firms are
generally not diversified, further increasing the volatility and risk faced by employees
with a stake in the firm’s viability.8 Because employment risk is closely linked to
the firm’s idiosyncratic volatility, managing a young firm imposes significant risk on
its CEO, perhaps explaining part of the recent decrease in CEO tenure.
A third reason is that scrutiny of the CEO and board has greatly increased.
The behavior and performance of both executives and directors has become very
visible, being monitored through multiple channels, most notably shareholder ad-
vocacy groups and the media. Misbehavior or disappointing performance from the
CEO is often immediately recognized, increasing the pressure for board members to
take swift action.
Widespread media coverage of executive compensation dates back to at least
1971, when Forbes magazine began its annual survey. Since that time, numerous
other outlets have compiled lists of the best paid American executives.9 This time
period is also characterized by the rise of shareholder advocacy groups, who act as
external monitors of firm’s management and board. If CEOs were ever afforded a
measure of anonymity or privacy, it is clearly a historical relic. Shareholder rights
groups and the media are directly responsible for exposing CEO fraud or impropri-
ety in at least a few cases, and are probably indirect participants in the downfall of
far more chief executives. Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2007) find that the media is
responsible for exposing roughly 14% cases of corporate fraud involving companies
with assets over $750 million from 1996 - 2004. In addition to exposing illegali-
ties or indiscretion, media coverage can have an effect on public perception of the
CEO’s ability or foresight, with potential real effects. Although data on this issue
are scarce, casual empiricism suggests that negative publicity surrounding some re-
cently dismissed CEOs (e.g., Carly Fiorina of Hewlett Packard) contributed to their
downfalls.
A final reason why CEOs appear to be increasingly expendable is that firms
may face lower costs of terminating and replacing poorly performing management.
8Indeed, the main point of Allayannis et. al (2007) is to relate the recent rise in idiosyncratic
volatility to decreasing average firm age.
9The list of such surveys is very large, including the Wall Street Journal, Booz Allen, and The
Chief Executive.
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Hallman, Hartzell, and Parsons (2007) develop model in which the frequency of
CEO replacement is inversely related to the direct frictions associated with transi-
tioning between top executives.10 Examples of these costs include: 1) detecting and
documenting misbehavior, 2) finding and training a suitable replacement, 3) sever-
ance or termination benefits, or 4) defending itself in any legal associated disputes.
Although time series data on these costs are generally not available, the argument
above suggests that the increased activity of the media may reduce the board’s costs
of detecting or assessing poor performance. More efficient compensation mechanisms
can play a similar role, increasing the board’s ability to identify poor CEO-specific
performance. For example, evaluating a CEO’s performance net of his industry (or
even aggregate market) performance removes noise from the evaluation process. In-
corporating hedging or other derivatives into the CEO’s compensation can have a
similar effect.
Of course, just because boards can more accurately measure CEO ability
or infer performance does not necessarily imply more frequent termination. With
agency problems, more efficient monitoring technology will likely lead CEOs to alter
their behavior. In the case of adverse selection, better screening tools and assessment
of managerial ability may introduce a new class of agency problems, such as that
studied by Zwiebel (1995). In his model, poorly skilled managers attempt to conceal
this private information by increasing the risk of the firm’s projects. Both of these
suggest that even if boards have superior information about their managers skills
and behavior, the effect on termination rates is unclear. However, it remains a likely
possibility remains that changes in firm’s termination and transition costs play a
role in the increased frequency of forced CEO departure.
2.4 Analysts/Investors as Stakeholders
“To lead, a CEO must first define a unifying direction for the company
which is inspirational for the organization. Choosing the right vision
and expressing it with clarity is the first challenge of true leadership ...
the vision statement should identify what is unique about your company;
it should guide the activities of all employees; it should inspire them to
10There are, of course, various indirect costs associated with replacing a CEO, including the focus
of this review: large scale changes in strategic direction.
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choose to work for your company and give their all; and it should be
stated in such a way that you can measure progress and know when you
have achieved your vision.” – Consulting firm CEOmentors website,
2007.
The above quote suggests that individual success is largely meaningless for
a CEO. Because his performance is measured at the firm level, the ability of a CEO
to stimulate long-term investments from parties with a stake in the firm’s future
(in this example, the firm’s workers) largely determines whether he and his strategy
are considered successful or not. In many cases, the firm depends on input not only
from its workforce, but from additional stakeholders as well - suppliers, customers,
financiers, and analyst following.
The relative importance of each stakeholder class depends on a variety of
factors, such as the firm’s industry, age, or competitive position. For example, a
fledgling software firm attempting to develop its initial products is far more likely
to depend on human capital investments by its R&D team than is a mature airline,
where customer-specific investments are probably more important. Reflecting the
differing nature of the firm’s relationship with each group, the ways that stakeholder
investments benefit the firm also vary. The effects can be relatively direct, such as
a supplier whose firm-specific technology investments afford the firm a cost advan-
tage over its competitors, or indirect, such as a stock analyst who, by producing
information useful for the firm, allows it to make better real decisions.
This section explores in more detail the idea of analysts having stakeholder-
like payoffs, even though the analyst may not directly transact with the firm. Among
their various responsibilities, analysts collect information about demand for a firm’s
products, evaluate the quality of its management, assess its competitive environ-
ment, and develop opinions about its long and short-term prospects. This infor-
mation is valuable for the investment community, specifically in retail stock rec-
ommendations and valuation models by investment banks and private equity firms.
However, the information can also feed back to benefit the firm itself.
For example, to the extent that information produced by analysts reduces
asymmetries between the firm and capital markets, the firm may enjoy a lower
cost of capital (Myers and Masluf, 1984). More efficient compensation is also an
implication of more efficient stock prices causes by better information production by
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a speculator/analyst (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993).11 The information produced
by analyst’s can also improve the firm’s real investment decisions, an idea explored
by Dow, Goldstein, and Guembel (2007). Clearly however, not all information
produced by analysts benefits the firm equally. For instance, inaccurate or redundant
information would seem to confer modest benefit at best. Factors that affect an
analyst’s accuracy or willingness to provide bold forecasts are therefore likely to be
of significant interest to firms.
The vast majority of literature studying information produced by analyst fo-
cuses on earnings forecasts.12 Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997), Clement (1999),
Jacob, Lys, and Nealse (1999), and Brown (2001) show that more experienced ana-
lysts provide more accurate earnings forecasts. This finding is perhaps unsurprising,
given that more accurate analysts are likely to be retained by their firms. However,
this result is also possible in the absence of ability selection over time. As analysts
accrue experience, both their general and firm-specific knowledge increases, which
likely improves forecast accuracy. Clement and Tse (2005) investigate the role of
both types of experience (i.e., both general and firm-specific) on earnings forecasts,
finding both predict accuracy and boldness.
While clearly related, there are important distinctions between an analyst’s
firm-specific and general experience. General experience is accrued across many
firms over the analyst’s career, allowing her to sharpen her general skills and knowl-
edge of the industry in which she specializes. Firm-specific experience, in contrast, is
more intimate. Over time, the analyst develops an assessment of a particular man-
agement team’s competence, having learned its strengths and weaknesses through
experience. With this knowledge, the analyst can better evaluate the firm’s com-
petitive strategy and position, combining both the feasibility of the strategy with
knowledge of the management team’s ability. In many cases, this knowledge may
be highly idiosyncratic, for not only does the competence across CEOs and lower
executives vary, but so do the strategies and visions espoused by each management
team. Knowledge of a particular CEO’s ability and strategy is not likely to be
fully transferrable across firms, or even across management teams within the same
11In this model, the private information of a speculator becomes impounded in the firm’s stock
price, allowing the firm to more accurately identify whether the manager has misbehaved or not.
The firm then provides more efficient compensation, increasing (decreasing) the manager’s pay in
states when proper (improper) behavior is most likely.
12Notable exceptions include recent work by Mayew et al. (2007).
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organization.13
This reasoning suggests an important role for the firm’s board. A board that
thinks highly of its CEO and management team is more likely to lend its coopera-
tion and support, likely generating a longer and more stable tenure for management.
Because such cooperation and stability are likely important considerations for an-
alysts asked to produce long-lived information about the firm’s strategies, a board
that appears committed to the CEO signals to analysts that it is safe to do the
same. Although the importance of this dynamic between the board and analyst
community may vary significantly across firms, the same argument applies to any
party whose investments depend on the board’s relationship with senior manage-
ment. The benefits of keeping the CEO on a short lease are well advertised - this
argument presents a justification for a board that is intentionally “softer” with its
top executives.
2.5 How a Board Can Enhance the CEO’s Credibility
The previous sections have laid the groundwork for the idea that tougher governance
is not necessarily synonymous with better governance. However, what has not been
discussed are the various avenues through which a board can enhance the CEO’s
credibility. This section explores two such devices: commitment mechanisms and
signals. I conclude with a more detailed discussion of compensation as a particularly
attractive signaling mechanism.
A board wishing to provide assurance to its shareholders, financiers, or stake-
holders about the CEO’s tenure can do so with a commitment device. For example,
roughly one-half of Fortune 500 firms provide their top executives with explicit em-
ployment agreements. These contracts vary significantly in many aspects, including
the term (often 3-5 years), renewal provisions, specifications of “just cause” for
termination, severance arrangements, and non-compete clauses.14 This flexibility
allows the board, if it chooses, to increase the cost of replacing the CEO (for exam-
ple, a particularly lengthy contract with a generous severance package triggered in
the event that the CEO is terminated).
13See section 2.2 for more discussion about CEOs and the uniqueness of firm strategies.
14See Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2007) for more details about descriptive contract features,
as well as firm characteristics that influence the likelihood that a CEO is offered a contract.
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The prevalence of employment contracts suggests distinct advantages of pro-
viding the CEO with such insurance. At least one rationale is to protect the CEO
against factors beyond his control, such as a hostile takeover.15 Providing such in-
surance to the manager may not only improve welfare through efficient risk shifting,
but may also create value if such a contract lengthens the CEO’s expected tenure.
To the extent that payoffs of stakeholder investments are threatened by the CEO
being terminated, a employment that mitigates this threat could add value to the
firm. However, for a commitment device to achieve this goal, it must be effec-
tive. Whether an employment contract offered to a CEO has a meaningful impact
on his tenure (or important characteristics about his tenure) determines whether
stakeholders alter their strategies based on the presence or absence of such a device.
For at least two reasons, it is reasonable to suppose that such commitments
may not, in reality, be credible impediments to replacing the CEO. The first is
feasibility, i.e., whether contracts can be written with large enough penalties to
have meaningful impacts on CEO tenure. The size of most public firms alone raises
this question. Although executive compensation is often viewed as exorbitant, for all
but the smallest firms, the CEO’s pay is a trivial cost when viewed as a percentage
of firm value. A second reason relates to personal costs facing directors should
they fail to replace a poorly performing CEO. From the increased media scrutiny
surrounding cases of so-called “captured” boards to recent shareholder class-action
lawsuits naming board members themselves, it seems unreasonable to conclude that
severance agreements could dissuade board members from replacing a poor CEO.
Supposing even that the board could credibly enter into a credible com-
mitment with its CEO, what impact would this have on stakeholder investments?
Clearly, if stakeholders care only about the CEO’s tenure, and if a contract can be
written precluding this possibility, then the problem is solved. However, in many
cases, non-contractible actions such whether the board lends its cooperation and
support to the CEO may significantly influence his credibility with stakeholders,
ultimately determining whether he is successful or not. This ‘advisory’ role of the
board is explored theoretically by Adams and Ferreira (2007), and is widely recog-
nized by the financial press as a crucial ingredient of CEO success.16 By withhold-
15Indeed, the majority of contracts contain “change of control” provisions, with payouts approx-
imating those incurred should the CEO be terminated without just cause.
16For example, the agenda for Found in Translation: A Toolkit for Chair Chief Executive Part-
nerships, a presentation at a 2007 CEO symposium in Denmark includes topics on: 1) A CEO’s
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ing its advice, support, or cooperation from the CEO, the board can force strategy
change, even in the absence of termination (of course, the rationing of support can
often be a precursor to termination itself). However, because, e.g., cooperation is
not verifiable, the role of commitment devices in enhancing the CEO’s credibility is
questionable.
A second mechanism that does not share this shortcoming is signaling. Rather
than explicitly commit to a certain behavior (such as retaining the CEO after poor
performance), the board takes an action to demonstrate its belief in the CEO’s abil-
ity. Assuming that the signal is credible, the firm’s stakeholders infer the board’s
assessment of the CEO, which in turn influences the willingness of these parties to
invest in long-term relationship with the CEO and management team. To be credi-
ble, signals must be costly; otherwise, all boards would mimic the action, removing
all information content of the ‘signal.’17 A second desirable feature of any signaling
equilibrium is that the cost of signaling is higher for worse types, in this context,
boards with lower opinions of their CEO’s long-term viability.
Good candidate signals are therefore actions whose costs to the firm vary with
the CEO’s ability. Debt is one such possibility. Apart from the tax incentive, the
most popular explanation for debt is its role in disciplining management (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), reducing free cash flow, and consequently, managerial discretion
to pursue pet projects with private benefits. By this reasoning, suboptimally low
leverage is costly to the firm, increasing the likelihood of wasteful (over)investment.
However, the previous discussion of credibility implies that for highly talented man-
agers, latitude can create substantial value for a firm. A highly talented manager
with penchant for timely investing will, in the absence of agency considerations, cre-
ate more value for his firm when unconstrained. Furthermore, stakeholders are more
likely to invest in a CEO armed with the freedom to execute his preferred strategies.
This suggests a signaling role for debt: firms with highly talented managers value
the added flexibility more than do firms with comparatively less talented managers.
Boards may therefore have an incentive to signal the manager’s capabilities with
guide to making the most of your board, 2) Communicating the strategic vision together, and 3)
Seeking early board involvement in strategy.
17Trivially, is the signal is not costly, there is an infinite number of equilibria involving both pure
and mixed strategies for signaling, none of which allow for the stakeholder to refine its belief about
the board’s information.
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seemingly suboptimally low debt levels.18
Another reasonable signal is the CEO’s compensation. If managers of higher
ability create more value for their firms, and if managers capture some of these value
improvements in their wages, then compensation, like leverage, is likely to contain
valuable information about the board’s assessment of the CEO’s capabilities. The
implication for stakeholders is straightforward. Compensation conveys information
about the CEO’s ability, which likely impacts not only the CEO’s tenure, but also
the degree of cooperation and support the CEO is afforded by the board. This en-
hancement of the CEO’s credibility increases stakeholder investments, and improves
firm value.
The role of compensation as a signal provides a novel rationale for high
CEO pay. In particularly, it suggests one reason why a board might intentionally
soften its bargaining position in wage negotiations with the CEO, leading to rational
overpayment of top executives. Although seemingly inefficient for shareholders,
“excess” compensation paid to the CEO can communicate the board’s belief in his
abilities, and future willingness to support his policies. If the benefits associated
with enhancing the CEO’s credibility in this way outstrip the direct cost of the
overpayment, then the board may find it optimal to do so.
2.6 Conclusion
Both the business press and academic literature give the distinct impression that
shareholder interests are unambiguously better served by independent, tough boards.
The merits of this argument are without question, especially in light of the numer-
ous recent cases of fraud and scandal. When agency considerations are first order,
the benefits of a strict board are apparent and significant. However, discipline is
only one aspect of the CEO-director relationship - the board can also be a sounding
board for the CEO’s strategy ideas, can lend its expertise or relationships, or can
offer advice. Its unique position also allows it to significantly alter the CEO’s credi-
bility with the firm’s workers, providers of capital, analyst following, and customers.
Because the board’s assessment of the CEO’s ability and performance has a mean-
ingful impact on his tenure, parties with an interest in the firm’s long-term viability
18An extensive literature documents the so-called ‘low leverage’ puzzle. Strebulaev and Yang
(2006) document an even more extreme subset of firms that have zero debt.
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also have an interest in the board’s opinion of the CEO’s performance. Thus, actions




Does Anonymity Always Benefit
Informed Traders?
3.1 Introduction
Traders have traditionally had little ability to influence the anonymity of their
trades. However, this is no longer the case. An ever-expanding landscape of trading
venues now offers considerable heterogeneity in the amount of anonymity traders are
afforded, from platforms offering complete anonymity such as INET or Euronext to
ones offering none, such as the Hong Kong or Austrialian Stock Exchanges.1 Char-
acteristics of traders also play a role in how much the market can infer about their
identities. Now more than ever, informed traders are likely to be hedge funds or
other relatively unregulated entities that not only escape disclosure requirements,
but also have significant flexibility to disguise their identity with anonymizing strate-
gies, e.g., breaking up large orders or routing through multiple brokers. Yet despite
the increasingly important role of trader anonymity in financial markets, research
has had little to say about its impact on market characteristics.
This paper is an attempt to improve our understanding of this issue, specif-
ically considering how trader anonymity influences the optimal strategies of an in-
1In the latter two markets, broker identities are nearly always disclosed when the trade is initi-
ated.
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formed trader, his expected trading profits, and the resulting price dynamics. Our
analysis yields some surprising results. First, we show that informed traders are
not necessarily better off in anonymous markets, which would seem to confer higher
expected profits via lower price impact of trading, i.e., Kyle’s (1985) liquidity. In
fact, we show that the relationship between anonymity protection and liquidity is
not so straightforward. The direct effect is that less trader anonymity decreases liq-
uidity, simply because informed trades are more frequently revealed as such, leading
market makers to adjust prices.
However, there is an opposing indirect effect stemming from an informed
trader’s response to such an increase in the chance that his trade is revealed. The
informed trader uses the increased visibility to his advantage, attempting to confuse
the market maker by “bluffing” and trading against his information. This occurs
when: 1) the stock is not badly mispriced (because trading against one’s information
is costly in proportion to the mispricing), and 2) when there is a high enough
chance that the bluff is revealed to the market maker (otherwise the bluff is useless).
Because the linkage between the informed trader’s demand and his information is
weakened, the market maker is more reluctant to adjusts prices in response to order
flow, i.e., liquidity is increased.
This increased liquidity results in higher expected profits for the informed
trader, but not directly - bluffing itself does not increase the trader’s expected
profits. Rather, it is the possibility that bluffing may be occurring that results in the
increased liquidity associated with less anonymous markets. To better understand
this, consider how bluffing helps a card player in a game of poker. When a player
has poor cards in a given hand, she may bet more aggressively than her cards may
warrant. Although she will almost certainly sustain a loss if her bluff is called
during that round, her opponents learn that aggressive betting is not always backed
up by good cards. Thus, they are more likely to challenge her betting in the future,
which pays off tremendously when she has the cards to justify the aggressive bets.
Likewise in a market where bluffing is known to occur, the market is deeper and
price is less sensitive to order flow. The benefits to the informed trader of increased
market depth are realized at times when the informed trader does not engage in
manipulation (though an informed trader with different information might).
A second class of closely related implications speaks broadly to the impacts
of bluffing on market stability and efficiency. Bluffing is destabilizing in that it
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moves prices away from fundamentals. Our findings suggest that this effect may be
self-reinforcing. Previous research has shown that if liquidity traders have discretion
over the timing or location of their trades, they will tend to avoid trading where or
when liquidity is low or there exists a high proportion of informed traders.2 This is
because informed trader profits are financed by liquidity trader losses. Therefore,
factors that increase informed trader profits will increase liquidity trader losses and
tend to drive liquidity traders toward alternative trading venues.
Also of interest is the interaction between anonymity protection, bluffing, and
information production. An informed trader is more likely to bluff when anonymity
protection is low and when prices more accurately reflect fundamentals, i.e., the
informational gap between the informed trader and market maker is narrow. This
suggests that the relationship between information production and price efficiency
isn’t necessarily straightforward. When more information is produced (due, for
example, to an increased number of analysts following a stock), prices will tend to
be closer to fundamental value, all else equal. However, because prices are closer to
fundamental value all else is not equal: informed traders have a greater incentive
to trade against their and push prices away from fundamental value. Since bluffing
is more likely in earlier periods when losses (or foregone gains) can be recovered,
early information production may actually decrease average price efficiency. This
temporary reduction in price efficiency is magnified when trader anonymity is poorly
protected.
Our model is based on Kyle (1985), but differs in important ways that allow
us to study varying degrees of trader anonymity. The most important departure is
the introduction of a parameter (“informational trade transparency”) that captures
the chance that the informed trader’s behavior is detected by the market maker. A
single informed trader is endowed with a binary (e.g., bullish or bearish) signal of
the liquidation value of a risky asset.3 The informed trader is known to exist, but
2See, e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Chowdhry and Nanda (1991).
3Our assumption of a single informed trader is important, but need not be interpreted liter-
ally. Even if there exists multiple informed traders, each is likely to possess some degree of unique
information. In this sense, the model may be viewed as studying the marginal component of an
informed trader’s order, that which is orthogonal to the information-based trade of other informed
traders. Section 4 discusses the impact of multiple informed traders in more detail. Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1992) study a multi-period Kyle (1985) model with multiple identically informed
insiders. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) study a multi-period Kyle model with multiple differently
informed insiders. Callahan (2004) studies a multi-period Kyle-type model with an unknown num-
ber of identically informed insiders. Dridi and Germain (2004) study a one period Kyle-type model
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her information is private. There are three rounds of trade and in each round the
informed trader can submit an order to buy or sell a single share (or not trade).4
The market also includes a cohort of liquidity traders who trade for exogenous
reasons and a risk-neutral competitive market maker. The aggregate liquidity trade
in each round is independent and drawn from a discrete uniform distribution. The
competitive market marker sets the market price in each trade round equal to the
expected liquidation value of the asset, conditional on the observed aggregate order
flow (and all previous trade). The model is solved by backward induction.
Our paper contributes to a small but growing literature on trader anonymity
in financial markets. Foucault, Moinas, and Theissen (2007) show that anonymity
influences how much information securities prices contain about future volatility.
Simaan, Weaver, and Whitcomb (2003) study collusion among dealers. They argue
that anonymous bid and ask quotes make it more difficult to maintain a collusive
equilibrium, as offending dealers are not identified, and as such, cannot be retaliated
against.5 Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) examine the impact of informed trading
on bid-ask spreads in markets that differ in anonymity.
Analysis of the informed trader’s optimal strategy also overlaps with litera-
ture on bluffing, or “trade-based” manipulation (Allen and Gale (1992)). Back and
Baruch (2004) study trading in both a Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom-type
(1985) setting, arguing that bluffing can arise in either setting. Although bluffing is
only one aspect of our analysis, the fact that it arises under alternative microstruture
environments means that our particular assumptions are not crucial for appreciat-
ing the results. Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001) show that insiders have an
incentive to “dissimulate” their orders following disclosure, with an intent similar to
bluffing of reducing the link between order flow and information. Chakraborty and
Yilmaz also study bluffing incentives in a Kyle-type (2004a) and Glosten-Milgrom
(2004b) setting with finite discrete order flow and liquidation value. Other relevant
papers include Fishman and Hagerty (1995), who study trade-based manipulation
from uninformed traders and John and Narayanan (1997), who shows that even a
with multiple identically informed insiders with binary signals.
4The assumption of net unit demand is innocuous because we allow mixed strategies for the
informed trader.
5This argument is broadly consistent with the findings of Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm
(1992), who note that floor brokers on the NYSE interact repeatedly with the same specialist, and
are easily identified.
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known informed trader may choose to manipulate the market.
3.1.1 Economic Environment
A single risky asset is traded in a market with three types of agents: a single risk-
neutral informed trader, a competitive market maker, and noise traders. There are
three successive rounds of trade. The asset pays a single cash flow ṽ after the final
round of trade. Prior to trade E[ṽ] = p0. For simplicity, the discount rate between
successive trade rounds is assumed to be zero. Prior to the market opening for trade
an informed trader receives a binary signal s ∈ {l, h} that is perfectly correlated with
the asset payoff. Without loss of generality, we set E[ṽ|l] = 0 and E[ṽ|h] = 1. In
each round of trade the informed trader can buy one share, sell one share, or not
trade (i.e., sit out of the market). The informed trader’s order flow in round n is
denoted xn. Therefore, xn ∈ {−1, 0,+1} for n = 1, 2, 3. xn may be the outcome
of a mixed trading strategy. We denote the informed trader’s trading strategy in
round n as Xn(s; pn−1). The per trade round order flow from noise traders, denoted
un, is i.i.d. discrete uniform [−w,+w].
6 A competitive market maker observes the
aggregate order flow in each round and sets price equal to the expected value of the
asset. The aggregate order flow is denoted zn = xn + un for n = 1, 2, 3 and the
market price set by the market maker in each round is denoted pn. We denote the
market maker’s pricing function in round n as Pn(zn; pn−1).
7
This setting is the same as that of Kyle (1985), but with different distribu-
tional assumptions and a restriction on the informed trader’s order size. Specifi-
cally, the informed trader’s information is binary rather than continuous, the noise
trader order flow is discrete uniform rather than normal, and the informed trader is
restricted to buy or sell a single share (or sit out) rather than submit orders of arbi-
trary size. We do not argue that our assumptions are better (or worse) than those
of Kyle. Simply, our modeling choices provide a tractible framework within which
we can consider both linear and nonlinear equilibria. Manipulative trade strategies
are by their very nature non-linear. The framework of Kyle allows for the solution
6All the results presented hold for w > 3. Some results need to be modified for w ≤ 3. We don’t
present detailed results for w ≤ 3.
7The informed trading strategy and pricing function are more properly denoted as
Xn(s, pn−1, . . . , p0) and Pn(zn, . . . , z1, p0). However, market efficiency dictates that prices follow a
martingale which justifies the notation used in the text.
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of linear equilibria, but nonlinear equilibria are intractable and therefore neither
ruled out nor confirmed.8 Overall, our assumptions equate to a discretization of
the model. With a discrete-space model we can explore and solve for all equilibria.
The discretization is the key departure; the specific discrete distributions chosen are
less consequential. The model would be more tedious to solve, for example, if the
informed trader were permitted to submit orders ranging from −k to +k shares,
but the qualitative nature of the results would remain. Similarly, if the informed
trader’s information were, e.g., binomial rather than binary, the qualitative nature
of our results would not change. We continue our discussion of the implications of
our distributional assumptions in Section 4.
3.1.2 Definition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium for the model comprises an informed trader trade strategy, X =
(X1,X2,X3), and a market maker pricing function, P = (P1, P2, P3) such that the
informed trader maximizes her expected future profits:
3∑
m=n
E [(ṽ − pm)xm(X,P )|s, p0, . . . , pm−1] ≥
3∑
m=n
E [(ṽ − pm)xm(X
∗, P )|s, p0, . . . , pm−1] ∀ X
∗ 6= X and n = 1, 2, 3
and price equals the expected future asset payoff conditional on the observed order
flow:
pn = E[ṽ|p0, z1, . . . , zn−1] for n = 1, 2, 3.
3.1.3 Optimal Strategies
The model is solved by backward induction. The equilibrium is presented and
discussed from the perspective of an informed trader with a high signal (s = h).
Given this perspective, when the informed trader buys a share she is trading with
her information and when an informed trader sells a share she is trading against her
information. Throughout the paper, we define trade-based market manipulation as
8Nonlinear equilibria do not exist in a one-period Kyle model. In addition, Back (1992) proves
that nonlinear equilibria do not exist in the continuous time Kyle setting.
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trading against one’s information, so that sitting out of the market and not trading
is not construed as market manipulation. The following proposition presents an
equilibrium to the 3-period model, a detailed proof of which is contained in the
appendix.9
Proposition 3 In the first round of trade, the informed trader’s trading strategy







0 w.p. θh1 (p0)
+1 w.p. 1 − φh1(p0) − θ
h
1 (p0),
where the functional forms for φh1(p0) and θ
h
1 (p0) are given in the appendix. There
exists a non-empty set of prices pC3 < p0 ≤ 1 for which φ
h
1(p0) > 0, i.e., for
some prices the informed trader trades against her information with strictly positive
probability. There exists a larger set of prices pC1 < p0 ≤ 1 where p
C1 < pC3 for
which θh1 (p0) > 0, i.e., the informed trader does not trade with some probability
during the first round.
In the second round of trade, the informed trader’s trading strategy X2(h; p1)






0 w.p. θh2 (p1)
+1 w.p. 1 − θh2 (p1),
where the functional form of θh2 (p1) is given in the appendix. There exists a non-
9We prove existence, but not uniqueness, of the equilibrium. There exist, at least, additional
equilibria that differ from the presented equilibrium in ways that are economically insignificant.
For example, if the informed trader’s information is fully reflected in market price prior to the
last round of trade (as can happen), in later rounds the informed trader is indifferent between all
feasible trading strategies as each and every one has zero expected profits.
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empty set of prices for which the informed trader will sit out during the second round
of trading.
In the third and final round of trade, the informed trader’s trading strategy
is the following pure strategy:
X3(h; p2) = 1
In all trading rounds n = 1, 2, 3, the market maker sets prices equal to the expected










































During each round, the informed trader’s optimal strategy is determined by com-
paring the relative costs and benefits associated with each of the available pure
strategies. In the final round of trading, this comparison is straightforward: trading
with one’s information delivers a positive expected profit,10 sitting out of the market
10The single exception is when p2 = 1, in which case the informed trader’s expected profits are
zero.
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and not trading on one’s information results in zero profit, and trading against one’s
information yields an expected loss. Because there are no future rounds of trade in
which to recoup a loss or otherwise benefit from not trading with one’s information,
it follows that in the last round of trade the informed trader will always trade with
her information.
Her behavior differs in the second to last round. For some prices, the in-
formed trader will follow a mixed strategy in which she sometimes trades with her
information and sometimes does not trade. The informed trader will never trade
against her information in the second to last period. To understand why an in-
formed trader may not trade on her information, consider the costs and benefits
of deviating away from a pure strategy in which the informed trader always trades
with her information.
If the informed trader always trades with her information then the price
the market maker sets after observing the aggregate order flow can take only three
values. If aggregate order flow is sufficiently low, z ∈ {−w − 1,−w}, the market
maker knows the informed trader sold and sets p2 = 0. Conversely, if order flow
is sufficiently high, z ∈ {w + 1, w}, the market maker knows the informed trader
bought and sets p2 = 1. Otherwise, the order flow contains no information about the
direction of informed trade and the market maker maintains p2 = p1.
11 Therefore,
with probability 22w+1 the informed trader’s information is revealed and she earns
no current nor future profits. With probability 2w−12w+1 however, p2 = p1, giving an
informed trader profit of (1 − p1) in the current period and an expected profit of
2w−1
2w+1(1−p1) in the final period. For an informed trader with a high signal, the pure
strategy of always trading with one’s information yields an expected profit in the
final two rounds of:














11For this range of order flows, −w+ 2 ≤ z ≤ w− 2, the market maker’s posterior belief (that is,
after seeing the aggregate order flow) about the nature of the informed trader’s signal is unchanged.
Consider, for example, if z = −w+ 2. Since the proposed equilibrium prescribes that the informed
trader trades with his information, then z = −w + 2 would have arisen from either {x = +1 and
u = −w + 1} or {x = −1 and u = −w + 3}. These events arise with probability p1 and 1 − p1
respectively, the market maker’s beliefs prior to seeing the aggregate order flow.
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Does the informed trader have an incentive to deviate from the pure strategy?
Yes.
If the informed trader chooses not to trade during the second to last round she
will forfeit her expected profits in that round (the first term in the above expression).
In return, she lowers the expected price at which she will transact in the final round.
Specifically, by not trading during the second to last period, the informed trader
generates the following price distribution:12 (1) p2 = E[v|s] w.p.
1
2w+1 (since z =
±(w+1) is now impossible), (2) p2 = p1 w.p.
2w−1
2w+1 as before, and (3) p2 = 1−E[v|s]
w.p. 12w+1 . By not trading, there is now only a
1
2w+1 chance that the market maker
correctly infers the informed trader’s information and there is an equal chance that
the market maker incorrectly infers the informed trader’s information (and sets














(1 − p1), (3.2)
where the first term is the benefit of having “tricked” the market maker by
sitting out the market and not trading.13
Only the first terms of expressions (3.1) and (3.2) differ. The first term in
(3.2) is positive and independent of price while the first term in (3.1) decreases
in price. Therefore, it can never be an equilibrium for the informed trader to
trade with his information for all prices. When price is sufficiently high, i.e., close
to fundamental value, the informed trader has an incentive to not trade on her
information and allow the price to ‘drift’ away from fundamentals prior to the final
round of trade. An informed trader with a larger informational advantage, however,
will follow the pure strategy of always trading with her information because the
foregone profits from sitting out are too large relative to the benefit of a possibly
12Here we are holding the market maker’s pricing function fixed. Of course, in equilibrium the
market maker’s pricing function will adapt to the mixed strategy of the informed trader. For now,




, the second to last period’s aggregate order flow is exactly −w, which
causes the market maker to set p2 = 1−E[v|h] = 0. In the last period the informed trader will buy.
With probability 2w−1
2w+1
the aggregate order flow will not reveal the informed trader’s order, giving
her a profit of 1 in the last period. Combining these independent probabilities gives the first term
of (3.2).
55
less efficient price in the last round of trade.
Sitting out the market and not trading on one’s information, of course, is
not manipulation. Sitting out the market is at least partially an artifact of having
a discrete order size: there are prices for which the informed trader would prefer to
trade a small fraction of a share rather than none at all. Nevertheless, the above
intuition is very useful in understanding if, when, and why an informed trader will
manipulate and trade against her information. Manipulation only happens in the
first of three rounds of trade. In this case, the marginal benefit of trading against
one’s information is that the market maker may move price away from fundamental
value, increasing future expected profits. The marginal cost is the difference in
the current round between the expected profit from trading with one’s information
and the expected loss from trading against one’s information. Like the 2-period
case described in detail above, the marginal benefit is relatively constant in price
while the marginal cost decreases in price (when the fundamental value is high).
When prices are far from fundamentals therefore, it is never worthwhile to trade
against one’s information. When prices are close to fundamentals, the marginal
benefit of manipulating can be made equal to the marginal cost by choosing the
appropriate mixing probabilities of each strategy. The probability of trading against
one’s information increases in price. This probability, φ(p0), is shown in Figure 3.1.
As the initial price, p0, moves from 0 to 1, an informed trader with a high
signal initially adopts a pure strategy of always trading with his information. When
the price gets sufficiently high however, the informed trader begins to mix between
trading with his information and not trading on his information (this probability,
θ(p0) is shown in Figure 3.2). As the initial price becomes higher still the informed
trader mixes between all three elements of his strategy space: trading with his
information, not trading on his information, and trading against his information.
As shown in Figure 3.1, the likelihood of trading against his information increases
with price. The likelihood of sitting out increases in price until the point when the
informed trader begins to manipulate by trading against his information, at which
point the likelihood of not trading on his information falls.
The combined probability of not trading on one’s information, or trading
against one’s information, increases in price. The combined probability, (θ + φ), is
shown in Figure 3.3. Notice that these probabilities decrease in w. In this setting,
one can interpret w, the noise trade distribution parameter, in two ways. First,
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Figure 3.1: w-contours of φ(p0) - Probability of Manipulative Trade











Figure 3.2: w-contours of θ(p0) - Probability of No Trade
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w is a measure of the amount of noise in the market during each trade round.
Second, w is an inverse measure of the likelihood that the informed trader’s order
will be perfectly inferable from the aggregate order flow. This second interpretation
is of particular interest because we are considering a setting in which the informed
trader is not subject to mandatory disclosure. That is, the informed trader is not
assumed to be an “insider.” This interpretation of (the inverse of) w corresponds
to what we refer to as informational trade transparency, namely the likelihood that
informationally motivated trades are recognized as such.
A market with high informational trade transparency is able to extract more
information from the order flow. For example, consider a market in which the mar-
ket maker sees individual orders. This market would have a very high informational
trade transparency if all informed traders had no non-information based motives for
trade (e.g., liquidity) and were subject to mandatory disclosure rules. If informed
traders had liquidity motives for trade in addition to their information-based mo-
tives, the market would have a lower informational trade transparency. Finally, if
the informed traders were not required to disclose their trades the market would
have an even lower informational trade transparency. In a market with no informa-
tional trade transparency no information could be inferred from the order flow. In
our model, a large w proxies for a market with low informational trade transparency
and a small w proxies for a market with high informational trade transparency.
Informed traders clearly prefer markets with lower informational trade trans-
parency. In such markets informed traders can transact undetected and earn large
profits. In such markets manipulation is also less likely. The benefit of trading
against one’s information is in moving prices away from fundamentals to increase
future expected profits. In markets with low informational trade transparency the
likelihood of an informed trader’s order moving prices is lessened, so the incentives
to manipulate are reduced. This raises an interesting tension. On the one hand,
higher informational trade transparency increases market efficiency via a more direct
link between informed order flow and market price adjustments. On the other hand,
higher informational trade transparency increases the incentives for informed traders
to manipulate prices by trading against their information such that the “informed”
order flow becomes less informative. This point has been discussed by Fishman and
Hagerty (1985) as it pertains to mandatory disclosure laws. We demonstrate that
this is a general consideration that pertains to any aspect of the market mechanism
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Figure 3.3: w-contours of θ(p0) + φ(p0)
that impacts informational trade transparency.
3.2.2 Informed Trader Profits
We now present a corollary to Proposition 1 that quantifies the expected profits of
an informed trader with a high signal of the risky asset’s value. Expected profits
conditional on a low signal are symmetric.
Corollary 1 The informed trader’s expected trading profits for the 3-period game
are a decreasing, piecewise continuous, and linear function in price. Below are the
expected profits for an insider receiving the high signal (s = h) prior to the first
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, if 1 ≥ p0 ≥ 1 − p
C4
0
πa = πbase +
(1+12w2)(8w2−p0(−1+2w)(1+2w)2)
16w2(1+2w)3
, if 1 − pC40 ≥ p0 ≥ 1 − p
C3
0
πb = πa +
(1+12w2)(8w2−p0(1+2w)3)
16w2(1+2w)3 , if 1 − p
C3
0 ≥ p0 ≥
1
1+2w
πc = πb +
4w(−1+2w)(1−p0−2p0w)
(1+2w)3
, if 11+2 w ≥ p0 ≥ 1 − p
C2
0
πd = πc +
(1+12w2)(4w(−1−4w+4w2)−p0(1+2w)2(1+12w2))
4w(1+2w)3(−1−4w+12w2)
, if 1 − pC20 ≥ p0 ≥ 1 − p
C1
0
πe = πd +
(1+12w2)(8w2(−1−8w+4w2)−p0(1+2w)3(1+12w2))
(1+2w)3(1+12w+16w2−112w3+48w4)
, if 1 − pC10 ≥ p0 ≥ 0.




0 , and p
C4
0 are given in
the appendix.
Figure 3.4 plots the expected 3-period profits of the informed trader as a
function of pre-trade price, p0, for various values of w. Larger values of w corre-
spond to a market that is more liquid with a lower degree of informational trade
transparency. Because liquidity increases with w, profits also increase with w. More
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interesting is the shape of the expected profit curves for each w. The curves are
drawn for an informed trader with a high signal. Expected profits decrease in p0
as expected: informed trader profits are lower on average when she has a smaller
informational advantage. What is striking is the region in which expected profits
are elevated (relative to a non-manipulation benchmark). Recall that an informed
trader with a high signal may manipulate when price is close to fundamental value,
but does not manipulate when price is far from fundamental value. In contrast,
Figure 4 shows that the informed trader earns excess profits when price is far from
fundamental value, and not when price is close to fundamental value. That is, in
price regions where the informed trader engages in trade-based manipulation, her
expected profits simply match those she would earn from not manipulating and
always trading with her information. While in price regions where the informed
trader exclusively trades with her information, she earns excess expected profits.
This means that the high-type informed trader earns excess profits in the price
region where manipulation would occur if a low-type informed trader were in the
market and the low-type informed trader earns excess profits in the price region
where manipulation would occur if a high-type trader were in the market.
Consider the case when price is close to zero. A price close to zero indicates
that the market maker believes there is a relatively high probability that a low-type
informed trader is in the market. The market maker also recognizes that when prices
are close to zero, a low-type informed trader may trade against her information and
submit a buy order. Therefore, if the market maker infers that an informed trader
submitted a buy order, the market maker updates his beliefs based on the relative
likelihood that the order came from a low-type informed trader trading against her
information versus from a high-type informed trader trading with her information.
Because the market maker has a high prior that the informed trader has a low signal,
the market maker is reluctant to raise price too much even when he is certain that
the informed trader submitted a buy order. This is an ideal situation for a high-type
informed trader. Like a card player who has bluffed in the past when her cards were
poor but now has a good hand, she can trade with her information and not cause
the price to move too far toward fundamental value even when the market maker
perfectly infers the informed trader order flow. Therefore, the expected profits for a
high-type informed trader are elevated due to the likelihood that a low-type informed
trader may be manipulating the market.
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Figure 3.5: Liquidity-adjusted w-contours of E(π(p0))
This also highlights the role of informational trade transparency. Figure 3.5
shows expected profits of the informed trader on a liquidity-adjusted basis for dif-
ferent values of w. The liquidity adjustment removes the non-manipulation related
effects of changes in w on liquidity, so that changing w only changes the informa-
tional trade transparency of the market. Specifically, larger w’s correspond with a
market in which it is more difficult (i.e., less likely) for the market maker to infer
the direction of informed order flow. The informed trader manipulates less, and
profits less, when informational trade transparency decreases. The informed trader
benefits when the informational trade transparency is high because this increases
the odds that manipulative behavior will be successful in pushing price away from
fundamental value. This, in turn, increases the incentive to manipulate, which ex-
pands the price region within which the market maker is ambivalent about how to
react to informed trade and lowers the price responsiveness to order flow, which
ultimately benefits the informed trader.
To summarize: (i) the direct effect of manipulation on informed trader profits
is simply to break even, (ii) the benefits of manipulative trade accrue to informed
traders who don’t manipulate, and (iii) the effects of manipulation are most pro-
nounced in markets with a high degree of informational trade transparency. Thus the
benefits to informed traders from manipulation are indirect. The potential of ma-
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nipulative trade changes the market dynamics to the favor of the informed trader.
Specifically, the possibility of manipulation increases market liquidity by making
prices more sticky and less responsive to order flow. An informed trader creates
(but doesn’t profit from) the price stickiness by manipulating when she has a small
informational advantage. An informed trader earns excess profits from the increased
liquidity by trading with her information when her informational advantage is large.
This lends support to Allen and Gale’s (1992) claim that trade-based manipulation
is difficult to detect and eradicate. Our model suggests that, in general, an informed
trader will not earn excess profits and engage in manipulation concurrently. Trade
reversals occur when an informed trader has a small informational advantage and
could credibly claim to have ‘changed their mind’ about the asset value. Excess
profits occur when an informed trader trades consistently in one direction. If both
trade reversals and excess profits are needed to prove manipulation, proof will be
difficult.14
All else equal, informed traders would like to trade in a market with a high
degree of informational trade transparency. This is especially so when an informed
trader is expected to have a small informational advantage, but in fact has a large
informational advantage. Of course, to some extent one expects informational trade
transparency and market liquidity to be inversely related as they are through the
joint effect of our w parameter: orders are easier to disaggregate and likely to
be less anonymous in markets with low liquidity. Even in such a case the profit
curves in Figure 3.4 indicate that when an informed trader has a large informational
advantage she may be willing to sacrifice market depth to gain higher informational
trade transparency so long as the market maker believes that the likelihood that an
informed trader might manipulate is sufficiently high.15 This is seen, for example,
by noticing that the manipulation based profit curve for w = 4 would exceed a
non-manipulation based (i.e., linear) profit curve for w = 6 for prices near 0. In any
case, our model suggests that there are circumstances in which an informed trader
would wish to make her actions more transparent by “leaking” her trading activity,
14Note, our focus is on understanding the feasibility, dynamics, and profitability of trade-based
manipulation. While our work may be relevant to legal and policy discussions regarding trade-based
manipulation, we explicitly are not making any arguments or claims about whether trade-based
manipulation is or should be legal or illegal.
15Of course the market maker’s beliefs can be rational if the informed trader is not expected to
have so large an information advantage as she actually does.
63
not breaking up a large order into multiple smaller orders, and the like.
3.2.3 Market Liquidity and Price Efficiency
Figure 3.6 shows the pre-trade expectation of the post-trade residual variance of
the asset’s liquidation value (i.e., after the final round of trading but before the
liquidation value of the asset is announced). The figure is drawn conditional on the
informed trader having received a high signal, which creates an asymmetric residual
variance profile.16 Absent manipulation the informed trader trades in the direction
of her information each period and the residual variance plots would be parabolas.
In our setting there is a constant probability, 2/(2w + 1), in each round that the
informed trader’s information will be revealed, independent of initial price. The
parabolic profiles therefore simply represent a constant scaling of the initial price
variance, which is parabolic owing to the binomial distribution of the informed
signal. With a binomial signal uncertainty is a maximum at p = 1/2. For very large
w it is unlikely that the market maker will perfectly infer the informed trader’s
information prior to the final trade date and the post-trade residual variance is very
close to the ex-ante uncertainty. As w decreases there is an increasing probability
that the informed trader’s information will be revealed and residual uncertainty
profiles are scaled appropriately.
The presence of manipulation changes the residual variance profile in a very
significant way. For prices near zero the residual variance plots are not parabolic
and, in fact, it is expected that the uncertainty regarding the liquidation value
will increase over the three rounds of trade. Figure 3.7 shows a close-up of this
price region. This region reflects the change in market dynamics attributable to the
manipulative trading strategy. Specifically, an informed trader with a high signal
can expect, when price is far from fundamental value, to trade in a more liquid
market owing to the effect of manipulation. The price is less responsive to order
flow because the market maker is uncertain whether to attribute an informed buy
order to manipulation by a low-type informed trader or to profitable trade by a
high-type informed trader. In this situation, when price is close to 0, a buy order is
very rare: a low-type informed trader is likely to exist, but she only trades against
her information with low probability. A high-type informed trader always trades
16Unconditionally, the figure would be symmetric around p = 0.5.
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Figure 3.6: w-contours of E0[p3(1 − p3)]
with her information, but her very existence is rare when price is close to zero.
Absent manipulation, price responsiveness could be quite extreme. In particular,
an inferred buy order from the informed trader would move price all the way to 1,
no matter how close to zero the previous price had been. With manipulation this
doesn’t happen.
Also note that the expected increase in residual uncertainty over the trading
horizon is most pronounced for low values of w. So much so that the effects of
manipulation outweigh the effects of increasing liquidity in w. Thus there are signif-
icant price regions for which markets with higher levels of noise trade (bigger w) are
expected to be more informationally efficient. We provide a new rationale for this
result. Naively, one might expect that increasing levels of noise trade would make
prices less efficient. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argued, on the contrary, that if
information production is costly, then prices can become more efficient when noise
trade increases because it allows more profitable trading opportunities for informed
traders and thereby stimulates information production. Kyle (1985) showed that
even absent costly information production, increasing levels of noise trade needn’t
impact price efficiency because the intensity of informed trade may increase pro-
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Figure 3.7: w-contours of E0[p3(1 − p3)]
portionally. We show that even in the absence of costly information production,
increasing noise trade may increase price efficiency by diminishing the incentives for
manipulative trade. This, again, is why an informed trader may actually prefer to
trade in a less liquid market versus a more liquid market, provided concerns about
bluffing are larger in the less liquid market.
Lastly, we comment on the scalloping of the residual variance plots. The
scalloped shape of the price efficiency curves arises from the discrete changes in
market maker beliefs represented by the different price regions in Proposition 1.
Within each region there is uncertainty about whether a price change will occur by
exiting the region to the right and raising the price, or existing the region to the
left and lowering the price. The uncertainty about the direction of the next price




The informed trader in our model is endowed with her information. Here we discuss
the interplay between manipulation, price efficiency, and costly information produc-
tion. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) showed that if information production is costly,
markets must be sufficiently ‘noisy’ for traders who invest in information to prof-
itably trade on their information. If the market is not ‘noisy,’ price is a sufficient
statistic for private information and uninformed free-riding undermines the incentive
to collect costly private information. Market noise is often assumed to come from
liquidity-based demand or other supply shocks. Our paper shows that an informed
trader can also generate market noise endogenously via trade-based manipulation.
All else equal, manipulation increases the expected profit from informed trade and
should lead to more information production. Additional information production
will offset the negative price efficiency effects of manipulative trade. Therefore, in a
setting with costly information production it is not clear whether the net effect of
manipulation on expected price efficiency will be positive or negative.
Also recall that the excess profits due to manipulation are convex in the mag-
nitude of the informed trader’s informational advantage, as shown in Figure 4. This
has several potentially interesting implications. First, this may create increasing re-
turns to scale for information production. Second, if different methods of producing
information have different risks with respect to the amount of information produced,
the convexity of the expected profits creates a bias toward risk-taking in information
production. Last, because there is a higher marginal benefit to generating a lot ver-
sus a little information, but because manipulation occurs when an informed trader
has a little versus a lot of information, it is possible that a model with endogenous
information production may have multiple equilibria or no equilibrium. For exam-
ple, excess expected profits accruing from a market with manipulation may dictate
that an informed trader should collect a lot of information. But if the informed
trader does collect a lot of information then her presumption of excess profits is
unjustified because no manipulation will occur in equilibrium. However, if the in-
formed trader collects only a little information owing to the lack of excess expected
profits, then in equilibrium the informed trader will manipulate and will have been
better off having collected more information.
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Endogenous Liquidity Trade
The amount of liquidity trade in our model is exogenously specified via w. The
effect of endogenizing the liquidity trade is uncertain. On the one hand, endogenous
noise trade may have a reinforcing effect on manipulative trade. All else equal, the
potential for manipulative trade leads to higher expected informed trader profits.
Informed trader profits are paid for with liquidity trader losses. Therefore, if liq-
uidity traders are given some degree of control over when or where they trade, they
will choose to avoid times or markets when the potential for manipulative trade are
high. As shown above, manipulative trading strategies are more likely to be adopted
in illiquid markets because illiquid markets are expected to have a higher degree of
informational trade transparency. Therefore, it might be the case that low liquidity
and manipulative trading strategies are mutually reinforcing.
On the other hand, manipulative trading strategies are more likely when the
expected informational advantage of informed traders is small. All else equal, liquid-
ity traders prefer to trade in a market where the degree of information asymmetry
is small. Therefore, if we take the ex ante degree of information asymmetry between
informed traders and liquidity traders as exogenous, it may be the case that high
liquidity trade and manipulation will be coincident in markets with low information
asymmetry while low liquidity and no manipulation will be coincident in markets
with high information asymmetry.17
Multiple Informed Traders
In our model there is a single informed trader. The existence of multiple informed
traders would effect the model significantly. Multiple informed traders would miti-
gate, if not eliminate, manipulative trade due to free-riding issues. Trading against
one’s information creates a public good (for the other informed traders), but a
personal bad. Informed traders may collectively be better off if they could com-
mit to a trading strategy including manipulative trade, but absent a commitment
mechanism, each individual trader may find it in her best interest not to engage in
manipulation.
It’s likely that the correlation among the information of different informed
traders may play a significant role. If multiple informed traders have heterogenous
17See Dow (2004) for a market model with endogenous liquidity trade and multiple equilibria.
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information, then it is possible that the informed traders will compete away the
common component of their information and then adopt a manipulative trading
strategy with respect to the unique component of their information. This intuition
is based on the results of Foster and Viswanathan (1996). A more formal treatment
of the impact of multiple informed traders is beyond the scope of the current paper
and left for future research.
3.3 Conclusion
This paper derives an equilibrium in which an informed trader engages in trade-
based manipulation. We show that a manipulative trade strategy can be profitable
even in the absence of mandatory disclosure rules or uncertainty about the presence
of an informed trader. We show that manipulative profits are indirect. An informed
trader who engages in manipulative trade is likely to be no better off than she
would be had she traded strictly in the direction of her information. In contrast, an
informed trader who does trade strictly in the direction of her information may earn
significant excess profits owing to the presence of the manipulative trading strategy.
In and of itself, manipulative trade undermines price efficiency. However,
if the excess profits attributable to adoption of a manipulative trading strategy
encourage additional information production, the net effect on market efficiency
is unclear. In general, actions and policies that make information-based trades
more visible and easier to infer encourage the adoption of manipulative trading
strategies. The indirect nature of the profits to manipulative trading strategies make
manipulation difficult to detect and eradicate. However, the indirect nature of the
profits also makes manipulative trading strategies susceptible to free-rider problems
in settings with multiple informed traders. As such, concerns about manipulative
trade and it’s perceived harms may be more relevant to smaller, less liquid markets
with fewer sophisticated participants.
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3.4 Appendix
3.4.1 Detailed Strategies and Pricing Rules in Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1
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0 for 0 ≤ p1 ≤
2w
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0 for z2 = −w − 1
θh2 (p1)·p1
(1−p1)+θh2 (p1)·p1
for z2 = −w
p1 for −w + 1 ≤ z2 ≤ w − 1
p1
θh2 (1−p1)·(1−p1)+p1
for z2 = w
1 else
In the third and final round of trade, the informed trader’s trading strategy
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is the following pure strategy:
X3(h; p2) = 1
X3(l; p2) = −1





0 for z3 ≤ −w
p2 for −w + 1 ≤ z3 ≤ w − 1
1 for z3 ≥ w
3.4.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The model is solved by backward induction. The equilibrium is presented and
discussed from the perspective of an informed trader with a high signal, s = h,
without loss of generality. We adopt the following notation. The price in trade
round n is pn. The informed trader’s order flow in round n is xn. The noise trader
order flow in round n is un. The aggregate order flow is zn = xn +un. The informed











In the last round of trade before the liquidation value of the risky asset is announced,
the informed trader submits his order x3 ∈ {−1, 0,+1}. There are no successive
period profits to be considered so the informed trader maximizes expected profit in
the current trading round. He is free to choose a mixed strategy over the feasible
orders, but trading with his information (x3 = +1) is a (weakly) dominant strategy.
The terminal period payoffs π|(p2, p1, p0, s) for each pure strategy x3 ∈ {−1, 0,+1}
are given by p2 − 1, 0, and 1 − p2 respectively. Since 0 ≤ p2 ≤ 1, it is trivial to
see that x3 = +1 weakly dominates all other strategies. The final round expected
profits equal 2w−12w+1(1−p2); there are two possible order flows (out of the 2w+1 order
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flows possible when x3 = 1) in which the insider’s signal is revealed, z3 = +w amd
z3 = +w + 1. In these states, p3 = 1 and the informed trader earns zero profit.
Period Two
Prices
During the second period, the market maker sets prices equal to the expected
value of the risky asset, taking as given the strategy of the informed trader. Suppose
that observed aggregate order flow were z2 = −w − 1. Since the minimum value of
the pure noise component is −w, the market maker knows that x2 = −1 has been
submitted. Only the underlying signal s ∈ {l, h} of the insider is uncertain. Either
an insider with s = h (probability = p1) submitted x2 = −1 which occurs with
conditional probability φ2(p1), or an insider with s = l (probability = 1 − p1)
submitted x2 = −1 which occurs with conditional probability 1−φ2(1−p1)−θ2(1−
p1). Applying Bayes Rule, the expected value of the asset given z2 = −w−1 is given
by:
p++2 = p2|{z2 = −w − 1} =
p1φ2(p1)
p1φ2(p1) + (1 − p1)[1 − θ2(1 − p1) − φ2(1 − p1)]
All other prices are identically formed, and may be interpreted as the probability
that s = h given z2. The remainder of the prices are given below:
p+2 = p2|{z2 = −w} =
p1[θ2(p1) + φ2(p1)]
p1[θ2(p1) + φ2(p1)] + (1 − p1)[1 − φ2(1 − p1)]
p02 = p2|{−w + 1 ≤ z2 ≤ +w − 1} = p1
p−2 = p2|{z2 = +w} =
p1[1 − φ2(p1)]
p1[1 − φ2(p1)] + (1 − p1)[θ2(1 − p1) + φ2(1 − p1)]
p−−2 = p2|{z2 = +w + 1} =
p1[1 − φ2(p1) − θ2(p1)]
p1[1 − φ2(p1) − θ2(p1)] + (1 − p1)φ2(1 − p1)
Expected Profits
The insider’s expected profits include those from the second and third rounds of
trade. Consider each the strategies x2 ∈ {+1, 0,−1} in turn. The expected profits
from submitting x2 = +1 allow for −w + 1 ≤ z2 ≤ +w + 1, which eliminate two of
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the five possible prices. If u2 ≤ +w − 2 (which occurs with probability
2w−1
2w+1), then
p02 = p1 as indicated above. Likewise, if u2 = +w − 1 (which occurs with
probability 12w+1), p
+
2 = p2. Finally, p
++
2 is possible if u2 = +w. Period two
expected profits, conditional on x2 = +1, written as a function of possible second
period prices p02, p
+
2 , and p
++
2 are:
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A similar expression results for x2 = 0. In this case, the most extreme prices (p
++
2
and p−−2 ) are precluded:
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Finally, expected profits given x2 = −1 are provided for an insider with signal
s = h. Now the two highest price regions are impossible, resulting in the following:
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Characterization of Optimal Trading Strategy for Two-Period Trading
Game
We conjecture the two-period equilibrium strategy given in Proposition 1, and
verify that no profitable deviations exist. For the entire price region, x2 = +1 is
submitted with positive probability; the profits from this strategy, therefore,
represent the relevant comparison for any potentially profitable deviation. We
begin by demonstrating that x2 = −1 is strictly dominated over the possible price
range, and can be eliminated from consideration.
Under the conjectured equilibrium, insiders never trade against their information.
That is φ2(p1) = 0 and φ2(1 − p1) = 0. There are still five possible prices, but they
are greatly simplified. In particular, both price extremes are now fully revealing,
i.e. p++2 = 1 and p
−−
2 = 0. Under the market maker’s belief that insiders never







































(0 − 1) + 2w−12w+1(1 − 0)
]
The left-hand side, representing the insider’s expected two-period profits from
trading with his information, is weakly positive for the entire set of possible prices
p ∈ [0, 1]. The expected profits from trading against one’s information are always
weakly less than zero for the two-period model, which can never exceed the profits
from trading with one’s information. The right hand side simplifies to the

























By iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies, we eliminate x2 = −1 from
further consideration, and restrict our attention to the mixed strategy space
spanned by x2 ∈ {0,+1}.
To show that x2 = +1 is strictly dominant for p1 ≤
2w
2w+1 , we set the expected












2w − 1 + θ(1−p1)(1−p1)θ(1−p1)+p1
]
Taking advantage of the symmetric structure of θ(p), we note that
p1 ≤
2w
2w+1 ⇒ θ(p1) = 0 necessarily implies that p1 ≤
1
2w+1 ⇒ θ(1 − p1) = 0.
Making this substitution and solving for θ(p1) easily results in the expected profits










(1 − 2p1), if p1 <
1
2w+1
Thus, in the penultimate round of trade, the informed trader may, depending on
the price, choose to not trade rather than trade with his information, but he will
never trade against his information.
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Period One
We show that the informed insider’s strategy is optimal given the market maker’s
pricing rule and that the pricing rule sets price equal to the expected value of the
asset conditional on the aggregate order flow and trade strategy of the informed
trader.
Prices
The expressions for prices are identical to those presented in the last section. We
present only p++3 , noting that only the time subscripts have been advanced by one
position:
p++1 = p1|{z1 = −w − 1} =
p0φ1(p0)
p0φ1(p0) + (1 − p0)[1 − θ1(1 − p0) − φ1(1 − p0)]
All other prices are formed identically.
Trading Strategy and Expected Profits
Period one and period two prices are functions of the probability of manipulation
(or sitting out), and expected profits, of course, depend on these prices. The
functional form of the informed trader mixing probabilities change over the price
region p ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, when evaluating the expected payoffs to each
strategy, we must consider each region independently. We begin by describing the
expected profits conditional on each pure strategy, E[Π1|x1 = +1], E[Π1|x1 = 0],
and E[Π1|x1 = −1], and apply these payoffs to each region. The price regions
correspond to different mixing probabilities, although informed traders with
different signals manipulate at opposite ends of the price spectrum.
E[Π1|x1 = +1] =
2w−1















E[Π1|x1 = 0] =
2w−1















E[Π1|x1 = −1] =
2w−1















Region 1: 1+8 w+32w
2+32 w3+48 w4
(1+2 w)2 (1+12 w2)
≤ p0 ≤ 1
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Given the proposed manipulation strategies in Proposition 1, and the pricing
schedule above, the expected profits to each pure strategy are given, after
substitution and simplification, as:
E[Π1|x1 = +1] = E[Π1|x1 = 0] = E[Π1|x1 = −1] =
(1−p0) (−1+2 w)(1+12 w2)
(1+2 w)3
Facing the same pricing rule, any mixed strategy
Λ ∈ R+3 ≡ {γ1, ρ1, 1 − γ1 − ρ1; 0 ≤ γ1 = Pr(x1 = 1) ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ ρ1 = Pr(x1 = 0) ≤ 1} over the pure strategy space will also yield the identical
payoff given above. Since the informed insider’s manipulation schedule
{φ1(p0), θ1(p0), 1 − φ1(p0) − θ1(p0)} ∈ Λ, then a rational expectations equilibrium
exists at the proposed equilibrium strategy. Thus, the insider will manipulate with
the schedule given by Proposition 1, and the market maker will set a price that the
insider anticipates. Note that this pricing region encompasses two regions where
all three pure strategies are utilized with positive probability.




1+8 w+32w2+32 w3+48 w4
(1+2 w)2 (1+12 w2)
Given the proposed manipulation strategies in Proposition 1, and the pricing
schedule above, the expected profits to each pure strategy are given, after
substitution and simplification, as:
E[Π1|x1 = +1] = E[Π1|x1 = 0] =
(1−p0) (−1+2 w) (1+12 w2)
(1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = −1] =
−1+p0+4 (−3+2 p0) w+8 (−3+p0) w2+16 (−5+6 p0) w3−48 (−1+p0) w4
4 w (1+2 w)3
After some algebra, one can show that for
p0 <
(1−p0) (−1+2 w)(1+12 w2)
(1+2 w)3
it is the case that:
E[Π1|x1 = +1] = E[Π1|x1 = 0] < E[Π1|x1 = −1].
Since the region of interest excludes this range of prices, x1 = −1 is strictly
dominated in this region, and cannot be part of any equilibrium strategy.
For the two remaining undominated pure strategies, their identical payoffs allow us
to argue with the same reasoning applied to region 1. Since the market maker
anticipates both x1 = +1 and x1 = 0 to be played with positive probability in
region 2, the proposed equilibrium strategy represents a rational expectations
equilibrium in region 2.
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Region 3: −1−2 w−4w
2+8 w3





E[Π1|x1 = +1] = E[Π1|x1 = 0] =
(1−p0) (−1+2 w) (1+12 w2)
(1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = −1] =
−
−1−6 w+16w2+48 w3+272 w4−224 w5+p0 (1+6 w+8w2+48 w3−304 w4+224 w5)
16 w2 (1+2 w)3
For p0 >
−1−6 w+80w3+80 w4+160 w5
(1+2 w)2 (−1−2 w−12 w2+40 w3)
one can show that
E[Π1|x1 = −1] > E[Π1|x1 = +1]. However, for w > 0|w ∈ R:
−1−6 w+80 w3+80 w4+160 w5





which is strictly outside region 3. Therefore, for the prices within region 3,
E[Π1|x = −1] is strictly dominated, and cannot be part of any equilibrium strategy.
For the two remaining undominated pure strategies, their identical payoffs allow us
to argue with the same reasoning applied to region 1 and 2. Since the market
maker anticipates both x1 = +1 x1 = 0 with positive probability in region 3, the
proposed equilibrium strategy represents a rational expectations equilibrium in
region 3.
Region 4: 8 w
2
(−1+2 w) (1+2 w)2
≤ p0 ≤
−1−2 w−4 w2+8 w3
(−1+2 w) (1+2 w)2
For this and all remaining regions, the claim is that both manipulation (x1 = −1)
and sitting out (x1 = 0) are strictly dominated for an insider facing prices
governed by the proposed equilibrium strategies in Proposition 1. In region 4:
E[Π1|x1 = +1] = −
(−1+p0) (−1+2 w)(1+12 w2)
(1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = 0] =
−4 w (−1+p0 (1−2 w)2+2 w−4w2)
(1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = −1] = −
1+2 w+12w2−8 w3+p0 (1+6 w−20w2+8 w3)
(1+2 w)3
It follows that:





(−1 + 2w) (1 + 2w)2
,
which for any w ∈ R is impossible within region 4. Therefore, x1 = −1 is strictly
dominated by x1 = +1 in this region. Also
E[Π1|x = 0] > E[Π1|x = +1] ⇐⇒ p0 >
−1 − 2w − 4w2 + 8w3
(−1 + 2w) (1 + 2w)2
,
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which by inspection is revealed as the upper border on region 4. Therefore, x1 = 0
is strictly dominated by x1 = +1. Only x1 = +1 survives iterated deletion of
strictly dominated strategies.





(−1+2 w) (1+2 w)2
In this region:
E[Π1|x1 = +1] = −
(1+12 w2) [8 (1−4 w) w2+p0 (−1−2 w−12 w2+40 w3)]
16 w2 (1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = 0] = −
8 w2 (3+8 w+20 w2−32 w3)+p0 (1+10 w+8 w2+16 w3−304 w4+288 w5)
16 w2 (1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = −1] = −
1+2 w+12w2−8 w3+p0 (1+6 w−20w2+8 w3)
(1+2 w)3
It follows that E[Π1|x1 = 0] > E[Π1|x1 = +1] ⇐⇒ p0 >
8 w2 (1+6 w+4w2+8 w3)
−1−6 w−16 w2+80 w4+96 w5
.
However, for w > 1,
8 w2 (1+6 w+4 w2+8 w3)
−1−6 w−16w2+80 w4+96 w5
> 8 w
2
(−1+2 w) (1+2 w)2
, which is the upper
bound on region 5. Thus for p0 ≤
8 w2
(−1+2 w) (1+2 w)2
, x1 = 0 is strictly dominated by
x1 = +1.
Similarly, E[Π1|x1 = −1] > E[Π1|x1 = +1] ⇐⇒ p0 >
4 w (1+2 w+8 w2)
1−6 w+12 w2+56 w3
, which for all
w > 2, is strictly greater than the upper bound of region 5.




E[Π1|x1 = +1] = −
(1+12 w2) (p0−8 w2+12 p0 w2)
4 w (1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = 0] =
8 w (−1−4 w−4 w2+8 w3)+p0 (1+12 w+16w2+80 w3−80 w4)
4 w (1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = −1] = −
1+2 w+12w2−8 w3+p0 (1+6 w−20w2+8 w3)
(1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = 0] > E[Π1|x1 = +1] ⇐⇒ p0 >
4 w (1+5 w+4w2+4 w3)
(1+2 w)2 (1+2 w+8 w2)
. However, for w > 2,
4 w (1+5 w+4w2+4 w3)
(1+2 w)2 (1+2 w+8w2)




. Therefore, x1 = 0 is strictly dominated in this region, and cannot be
part of any equilibrium strategy.
E[Π1|x1 = −1] > E[Π1|x1 = +1] ⇐⇒ p0 >
4 w (1+2 w+8 w2)
1−6 w+12 w2+56 w3
. However, for w > 0,
4 w (1+2 w+8w2)
1−6 w+12 w2+56 w3
is strictly greater than the upper bound for region 6. Therefore,
x1 = −1 is strictly dominated in this region, and cannot be part of any equilibrium
strategy.
Region 7:
4 w (−1−4 w+4w2)






E[Π1|x1 = +1] = −
p0+8 (1+p) w2−32 w3+16 (−6+13 p) w4
4 w (1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = 0] =
8 w (−1−6 w+8w3)+p0 (1+12 w+32 w2+80 w3−144 w4)
4 w (1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = −1] = −
1+6 w+4 w2−8 w3+p0 (1−2 w)
2 (1+6 w)
(1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = 0] > E[Π1|x1 = +1] ⇐⇒ p0 >
4 w (1+5 w+4w2+4 w3)
(1+2 w)2 (1+2 w+8 w2)
. However, for w > 0,
4 w (1+5 w+4w2+4 w3)
(1+2 w)2 (1+2 w+8w2)
> 11+2 w , indicating that x1 = 0 is strictly dominated by
x1 = +1 in region 7.
E[Π1|x1 = −1] > E[Π1|x1 = +1] ⇐⇒ p0 >
4 w (1+2 w+8 w2)
1−6 w+12 w2+56 w3 . However, for w > 0,
4 w (1+2 w+8w2)
1−6 w+12 w2+56 w3 >
1
1+2 w , indicating that x1 = −1 is strictly dominated by
x1 = +1 in region 7.
Region 8:
8 w2 (−1−8 w+4w2)
(1+2 w)3 (1+12 w2)
≤ p0
4 w (−1−4 w+4 w2)
(1+2 w)2 (1+12 w2)
In this region:
E[Π1|x1 = +1] = −
1+2 w (1+4 w+4 (p0+2 p w+4(4+p) w2−2 (3+4 p) w3+12 (−3+8 p0) w4))
(−1+2 w) (1+2 w)3 (1+6 w)
E[Π1|x1 = 0] =
8 w (−1−6 w+8w3)+p0 (1+12 w+32 w2+80 w3−144 w4)
4 w (1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = −1] = −
1+6 w+4 w2−8 w3+p0 (1−2 w)
2 (1+6 w)
(1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = 0] > E[Π1|x1 = +1] ⇐⇒ p0 >
4 w (−3−16 w+32 w3+48 w4)
−1−14 w−8 w2+16 w3+304 w4+672 w5
. However,
for w > 1,
4 w (−3−16 w+32w3+48 w4)
−1−14 w−8 w2+16 w3+304 w4+672 w5
is strictly greater than the upper bound
for region 8. Therefore, x1 = 0 is strictly dominated in this region.
E[Π1|x1 = −1] > E[Π1|x1 = +1] ⇐⇒ p0 >
2 (−1−6 w−12 w2−32 w3+64 w4+96 w5)
(1+2 w)2 (1+10 w−52 w2+120 w3)
.
However, for w > 1,
2 (−1−6 w−12 w2−32 w3+64 w4+96 w5)
(1+2 w)2 (1+10 w−52w2+120 w3)
is strictly greater than the
upper bound for region 8. Therefore, x1 = −1 is strictly dominated by x1 = +1 in
this region.
Region 9: 0 ≤ p0 ≤
8 w2 (−1−8 w+4w2)
(1+2 w)3 (1+12 w2)
In this region:
E[Π1|x1 = +1] = −
1+6 w+192 w3+112 w4−96 w5+p0 (1−2 w)
2 (−1+2 w+20 w2+88 w3)
(1+2 w)3 (−1−8 w+4w2)
E[Π1|x1 = 0] =
8 w (−1−6 w+8w3)+p0 (1+12 w+32 w2+80 w3−144 w4)
4 w (1+2 w)3
E[Π1|x1 = −1] = −




E[Π1|x1 = 0] > E[Π1|x1 = +1] ⇐⇒ p0 >
4 w (−3−34 w−88 w2−128 w3+16 w4+32 w5)
(1+2 w)2 (−1−20 w−16 w2−112 w3+208 w4)
.
However, for w > 3, this condition cannot be satisfied within the bounds of the
region. Therefore, x1 = −1 is strictly dominated by x1 = +1 for region 9.
E[Π1|x1 = −1] > E[Π1|x1 = +1] ⇐⇒ p0 >
−(1+10 w+24 w2+96 w3+16 w4−32 w5)
8 w (1−4 w2)2
.
However, for w > 2, this condition cannot be satisfied within the bounds of the
region. Therefore, x1 = −1 is strictly dominated by x1 = +1 for region 9.
Q.E.D.
This completes the proof of the equilibrium strategies proposed in Proposition 1.
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